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Abstract 
This thesis sets out to determine possible links between the 
depleting water resources in Israel and the country's hegemony over the 
water-rich area of south Lebanon. The early Zionist and later Israeli 
leaders have coveted the Litani river of Lebanon, to which Israel has 
had access since 1978. Israel's replenishable water stock is being 
fully utilized. This fact is the basis of the theoretical motif of the 
thesis, namely state conflict induced by resource scarcity. Thus 
conflict theory is discussed and a model of conflict process is 
derived. 
Also discussed are 1) the reasons for the high water consumption in 
Israel, 2) water supply and demand in the country, 3) the degradation 
of fresh water sources, and 4) the domestic and foreign options 
available for Israel to ameliorate the impending water crisis. 
Lebanon's Litani river is seen as Israel's best answer to its water 
problem. A diversion of the Litani into the Jordan river would, 
however, strongly affect the economic and demographic growth in both 
Lebanon and Israel. Such a diversion would also have destabilising 
regional implications, especially for Lebanon. Against this background 
the conflict model is tested, and a revised one is proposed; one that 
is more reflective of the conflict process while under conditions of 
"natural" scarcity. In conclusion, there appears to be a hydrological 
dimension to Israel's presence in the "security belt" of south Lebanon. 
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C H A P T E R O N E 
Introduction 
One of the most vital resources to life is water. It is 
essential to health, agriculture, energy, industry, transportation, 
and recreation; in short, to human existence, and to the economic 
viability and prosperity of states. This makes water a strategic 
resource, especially to states in arid regions. 
The climate of most countries in the Middle East is arid, 
semi-arid, or a combination of both. Israel is an example of the 
latter. Prior to the establishment of Israel in 1948, the question 
of water was of perennial importance to the Zionist founders of the 
state. They sought the borders of the Jewish state-to-be to- include 
most of Lebanon's Litani river, the Jordan river and all its 
tributaries. Zionist demands were, however, not realized when the 
United Nations partitioned Palestine in 1947 into an Arab state and 
a Jewish one. 
Many Arab states believe that the Zionists accepted the 
partition as a first step towards the creation of an Eretz Israel 
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(i.e. the Land of Israel stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates). 
Arab fears of an alleged Israeli expansionist policy were compounded 
by pronouncements of Israeli leaders in, for example, the Israeli 
government's Year Book (1951: 402) which states that "Only now have 
we reached the beginning of independence in a part of our small 
country." It then added that "... to maintain the status quo will 
not do. We have set up a dynamic state state bent upon ... 
expansion" (1951: 419). A similar pronouncement was made by Moshe 
Dayan in the 1960s when he declared that Israel's northern borders 
are "not satisfactory" (Naff and Matson, 1984). 
The Arab states' fears of the expansionist nature of Israel were 
confirmed after the June War of 1967; a War in which Israel occupied 
territories from three of her four neighbouring states, thus greatly 
enlarging the area of the once-small country. The Arab concern over 
these expansionist tendencies was rekindled in 1978 when Israel 
invaded Lebanon and established the so-called "security belt/zone" 
in the southern part of the country. Israel's involvement in the 
affairs of south Lebanon is viewed by many Arab and Lebanese 
officials as a hydro-strategic step that would ultimately lead to 
the expropriation of south Lebanon and the diversion of the Litani 
river into Israel. 
Since the 1960s Israel's water needs have been paralleled with 
its successive territorial gains which supplemented the country's 
dwindling water supplies. Due to Israel's (1) depleting water 
supplies, (2) its need to access new sources of water, (3) the 
strategic significance of the resource, and (4) the geopolitical 
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realities in the Middle East, territorial expansionism becomes an 
inevitable course of a water-deficient, advantaged, and largely 
isolated state of Israel. 
The objective of this thesis is to determine the relationship 
between water scarcity in the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, in particular that between Lebanon and Israel. In pursuit 
of this objective, the hydrologic dimension of Israel's occupation 
by proxy of the so-called "security zone" is explored. Israel 
maintains that this zone is needed to protect its northern region 
from "terrorist" attacks. This research suggests that the "hidden" 
objective of this zone is to "secure" Israel's access to the water 
resources of south Lebanon, the most important of which is the 
Litani river. 
Israe-1's aggressive policy towards south Lebanon is tested in 
the conceptual framework of conflict between states over scarce 
resources. A model describing the process of conflict is developed 
and tested in the context of water scarcity. This becomes the basis 
of an analysis which aims to derive a refined model that can be 
employed to determine the general geo-political impacts of onsetting 
resource scarcities. 
An analysis of Israel's water policy is essential to interpret 
accurately the country's hydro-strategic planning, its political, 
economic, and perhaps territorial objectives. Once these 
factors/objectives are clearly understood, the broader Arab-Israeli 
conflict can be better understood; perhaps leading to a realistic 
solution to the larger conflict. 
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The literature that has been written on the "Arab-Israeli water 
conflict" is devoid of either quantitative data or of the 
socio-political background to the problem. Moreover, the literature 
is devoid of a theoretical framework that could explain the 
geopolitical implications of state competition for scarce resources. 
Hence, the methodological approach used in this research is 
primarily descriptive, supplemented by data from the statistical 
abstract of Israel, and authors on the water resources of the Middle 
East. There are no recent governmental data on Lebanon's water 
demands and supplies. Thus the data are from writers on the 
hydrology of Lebanon, and from recent articles that appeared on this 
subject in Lebanese newspapers and magazines. 
Following the introduction chapter of this thesis is a 
discussion of conflict theory, its evolution and processes. This 
discussion includes a model of conflict process, which becomes the 
focal point of the theoretical discussion and analysis. Chapter 
Three provides a historical background to the water conflict between 
Lebanon and Israel tracing it from 1905 to 1978. Chapter Four 
presents an analysis of water supply and demand in both Lebanon and 
Israel. The latter country's need for new water resources, 
specifically the Litani river of Lebanon, are two of the objectives 
of this chapter. It also establishes the economic and political 
significance of the Litani river to Lebanon. Chapter Five tests 
conflict theory and the conceptual model presented, earlier, thus a 
refined model of conflict process is derived. A summary of the 
thesis and a number of conclusions are presented in Chapter Six. 
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This thesis confirms the partial applicability of the process 
of conflict model in situations of resource scarcity from which a 
refined model is derived. The hydrological riches of south Lebanon 
are also confirmed to be a contributing factor to the state of 
hostilities between Lebanon and Israel, and to the latter's 
occupation by proxy of the "security zone." 
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C H A P T E R T W O 
The Causes, Processes, and Resolution 
of Conf1ict. 
A Theoretical Approach 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the theoretical approach 
within which international conflict and its developments can be 
analysed. The concept of conflict is far more dynamic and complicated 
than the common usage of the term implies. Dr. R.J. Rummel (1975, 
1976, 1977, 1979, and 1981) has written, for example, a five volume 
series on Understanding Conf1ict and War, and innumerable other writers 
have broached the issue on both the micro and macro levels. 
In this chapter, the concept of "conflict" will first be defined, 
and then the causes and contributing factors to it are systematically 
analysed. Also discussed are the various evolutionary phases of a 
conflict. The conclusion discusses various approaches to conflict 
resolution. The theoretical framework discussed here is also a testing 
ground for the subsequent case study and how well it fits the theory of 
conf1ict. 
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2.1 Preliminary Definition of Conflict 
Throughout this thesis, the word state is used as a 'short hand 
expression.' Depending upon the context in which it is used, state may 
refer to those making decisions on behalf of the people, those 
influencing these decisions, or all the citizens of the political 
entity (Levi, 1960: 411). The state is future-oriented and this 
influences its behavior in identifying future goals (eg. future 
resource needs) and working towards them (Choucn and North, 1975). As 
a result, and for the sake of consistency and convenience, the state is 
adopted as the basic unit of analysis in the thesis. 
Most studies of the theory of conflict do not deal with 
international conflict between states but with urban/social or 
domestic/family conflicts. Therefore, for the purpose of deriving a 
coherent-theory, concepts such as "spouses" are replaced by "states", 
social "values and norms" by "ideologies", and "class and status" by 
"state ranks". This approach is essential so that consistency is 
maintained in the discussion. Albeit rare, there are shadows of an 
analytical discourse apparent in parts of this chapter. This is due to 
the interdisciplinary nature of conflict theory, and the scope of the 
factors that contribute to the actual manifestations of conflict. This 
led scholars like Fink (1968) and Boulding (1957) to assert that there 
cannot be a single, one dimensional theory of conflict. 
Disputes are defined by Rummel (1979) as "felt grievances" by 
states capable of waging war. But when military options are introduced, 
disputes become conflicts. Rummel goes on to define conflict as 
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the subset of all disputes between parties capable of waging 
war in which the military option has been introduced, and at 
least one party perceives the issues at stake in partially, 
if not wholly, military terms (Barringer, 1972 as quoted by 
Rummel, 1979: 190). 
It is assumed that two or more states are in conflict if and when they 
pursue the same objective, making their interests incompatible and 
hence leading them to acts or gestures of hostility toward each other. 
The incompatible objectives may involve: competition over markets or 
physical resources; territorial disputes; control over human resources; 
or they may involve aspirational issues (Dowty and Kochan, 1976: 43). 
A conflict, then, must include one or more of the following 
characteristics: 1) Acts of political subversion, directed by a foreign 
power, that do not normally violate the boundaries of the targeted 
state; 2) economic imposition which could include sanctions, boycotts, 
or blockades; 3) verbal accusations or attacks, threats to attack, or 
retaliate, or to continue attacking; 4) non-violent military 
manoeuvres, exercises, mobilization, or authorization of military 
action that is deemed threatening in some way; and 5) direct military 
confrontation which can be a limited or full-scale war between two or 
more states. These are the main ingredients of a conflict. But what is 
the process that leads to and causes tension and violent conflict? 
2.2 Causes of International Conflict. 
Conflict is viewed as a direct outcome of growth. According to 
Choucri and North (1975) and North (1977), the root causes of 
international conflict are directly related to a blend of the following 
factors: firstly, conditions of internal demographic and economic 
growth, and the external expansion of interests; secondly, competition 
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for resources, markets, superiority in arms, and strategic advantage. 
Global demographic growth, technological advancements, and the 
continuous improvement of living standards have all led to higher 
demands for -additional resources and finished goods. As a result, 
mankind has had to employ larger amounts of energy to satisfy material 
needs and desires. This growth has been governed and managed according 
to national priorities, which are influenced by government allocation 
of resources, both material and human (Choucri and North, 1975). These 
resources in turn shape national capabilities. 
Capabilities of a country include, naturally, all aspects of its 
military force, as well as the country's light and heavy industrial 
infrastructure, labour needs, and among other things, an agricultural 
base. In this context, Choucri and North (1975: 16) note that 
When demands are unmet and existing capabilities are 
insufficient to satisfy them, new capabilities may have to be 
developed. But a society can develop particular capabilities 
(including resources) only if it has the necessary existing 
capabilities to do so. Moreover, if national capabilities 
cannot be attained at a reasonable cost within national 
boundaries, they may be sought beyond. 
Capability-building activities resulting from the pressures of domestic 
growth more often than not necessitate expansion into foreign 
territory. This is referred to by Choucri and North (1977) as "lateral 
pressure" while the more common term for such activities is 
"expansionism". It is usually expressed in real terms as an external 
expansion of interest on a territorial, social or economic level. 
A multitude of factors may induce a state to pursue expansionism. 
These factors are largely dependent upon the "nature of the demands 
that are not being satisfied domestically and on the capabilities that 
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are available" (Choucri and North, 1975: 17). Expansion of interests 
usually occurs when national demands are growing in the face of limited 
resources; a situation where the government feels compelled to satisfy 
demands in one way or another. Furthermore, (territorial) expansionism 
is a function of a country's need to protect its current or anticipated 
trade routes, or access to strategic resources and minerals (North, 
1977). 
» 
As mentioned earlier, the state and its resource needs are 
future-oriented. Moreover, a state which is accepting of or satisfied 
with the status quo at one point in time, may not necessarily be in the 
same position in the future. Therefore, "conflict may remain latent 
between international actors. Leaders may change, domestic interests 
may shift, new ideologies may become ascendent," and technological 
innovations and developments may alter relative capabilities and 
domestic demands of states (Rummel, 1979: 167). A good example of this 
change of orientation is the massive Jewish immigration to Israel in 
the first ten years after the establishment of that state. The 
country's domestic demands rose sharply as a result of the rapid 
population growth and its strategic interests expanded beyond the 
initial boundaries. This pressure from within to expand in order to 
accommodate growth was partly to blame for the Jordan river dispute 
which in turn contributed to the 1967 Six Day War (Stauffer, 1982; Hof, 
1985). 
Knowing that growth is a continuous process, .and having mentioned 
that states are future-oriented in their outlook, the latency of state 
attitudes take on particular importance. Such attitudes are defined or 
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governed by the rate of growth, severity of needs, level of 
capabilities, the rank of the states involved, or by a number of other 
less significant factors. 
Each country has a specific latent attitude. States, however, tend 
to differ in their ways of expressing their latent "ends, wants, and 
goals, and the means to achieve them. Within the structure of conflict, 
these attitudes are inactive; they are dispositional forces waiting for 
stimulation" (Rummel, 1979: 162). Latent conflict attitudes are 
embodied in state relations and activated by change. These attitudes 
may be manifested in a number of ways such as: 1) by skyrocketing 
demand of a certain good or resource; 2) by political change where new 
ideologies (political or religious) become a dominant force; and 3) due 
to technological advancements whereby societies' perceptions of "need" 
become a-ltered and their demands for more and better things become 
larger. Therefore, and as Coser (1957: 64) noted, "Change, no matter 
what its source, breeds strain and conflict." 
Competition for human and natural resources, a better standard of 
living, and stronger trade links are converging and inevitable paths in 
the development of a state. Such competition is crucial for states' 
existence and prosperity. Quincy Wright (1951) asserts that in a 
competition, 
The successful nations grow and prosper; the unsuccessful 
decline. It is true that, because nations are geographically 
circumscribed and immovable, this competition may induce 
efforts to expand territory at the expense of others, and 
thus lead to conflict. This, however," Wright claims, "is a 
product of civilization" and not a Darwinian "struggle for 
existence" from which "only the fittest survives" (198). 
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A society that is facing population growth and rapid 
industrialization often faces pressures of limited or insufficient 
resources. These problems are usually solved peacefully where the state 
imports the necessary resources or invests in related technological 
research projects. But if the demand for resources is a strategic one 
and their supply is only located in a handful of (possibly hostile) 
countries, the problem then takes on a whole different dimension. 
Like competition, international links are essential factors in the 
survival and prosperity of a state. This is why blockades, boycotts or 
sanctions are often viewed by the inflicted state as acts of war. 
Coercive foreign policy decisions are sometimes taken as a response to 
resource scarcity. Such reaction of a state or an alliance (eg. The 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO) is only normal and to be 
expected-. After all, a shortage of resources, especially of strategic 
minerals, will eventually lead to the decline of state capability, 
making the state vulnerable. The 1973 Arab oil embargo is just one 
such example. The oil-dependent West, especially Western Europe and 
Japan, were coerced by the Arab states to reconsider their "blind 
support" for Israel and to follow a more "balanced" foreign policy path 
in the Middle East. But does every state have the option to coercively 
realize its objectives? And, when does such a policy become 
imperative? 
Despite possible ethnic, ideological (both religious and 
political), and aspirational commonalities between states, they often 
have vast differences in economic wealth, socio-economic and political 
prestige, and in their military and political capability (which may be 
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peaceful or coercive). Therefore, there is an accepted implicit 
ranking of each country based on a set of positive-valued aspects of a 
state's "field of expression"; meaning its capability (Rummel, 1977: 
197). 
The concepts of "fields" and "antifields" which characterize all 
modern states to some extent are described by Rummel as opposites; "as 
one advances, the other must recede" (1977: 15-17). For example, 
although the United Nations partitioned Palestine into an Arab and a 
Jewish state, the newly founded Jewish army of Israel expanded its 
territory into the Arab sector. Since then, Israel has expanded its 
territorial base several times. Therefore, Israel became the antifield 
of the larger and established Arab field. The international rank of a 
state is a good indicator of the possibilities that it may consider 
coercive-policies if competed against for resources or markets or if it 
is inflicted with a resource shortage. Ranking is a relative concept, 
and in this case a country's rank is relative to its "antifield". 
Antifields are determined by interests, and influenced by distances 
and diverse wills, economic disparities and expectations, and by 
various political ranks. Therefore, a state is a space where a complex 
system of balance of power is maintained. For this dynamic system to 
exist, states must attend to both internal and external pressures. 
States often try to accommodate their demands peacefully, so when 
states' interests overlap or coincide, we then have a resultant vector 
of cooperation. But if states' interests differ, the resultant vector 
is one of coercion (Rummel, 1977; 1979). 
States, like people, can be classified as advantaged or 
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disadvantaged in terms of those who command and lead, contrasted to 
those who obey and follow. The advantaged states usually have a 
greater authoritative power (ie. economic, socio-political, and 
military) than the disadvantaged ones. Clearly, advantaged states have 
a coercive capability which can be wielded overtly in open 
confrontations, or covertly such as owning a deterrence force or 
commodity (eg. Arab oil and South Africa's strategic minerals). 
Therefore, state ranking is a way of arranging conflict groups among 
those with the potential to disrupt, or maintain and defend the status 
quo (Rummel, 1977). Here the status quo is used to define what belongs 
to a state, and what it can lay claim to — i e . the acceptable state 
accesses that don't trigger change. Although status quo may be 
achieved explicitly through treaties, contractual documents, or even 
verbal agreements (say between husband and wife), it often is not. The 
ongoing conflict interaction between states (like "trade wars") is the 
process through which they understand their rights, know their space, 
what can be claimed and on the other hand, what is likely to trigger 
conflict in the system —the conflict threshold. 
2.3 Conflict Evolution 
2.3.1 An Introduction 
According to Rummel (1979: 192), conflicts among states are usually 
of a particular type, namely "a clash of convictions about 'ours' and 
'theirs'". An example of this is the Arab-Israeli conflict over the 
boundaries of historic Palestine and how much of it belongs to whom. 
The seeds of tension-inducing conflict are sown when the status quo 
is disturbed putting a state in a position compelled to respond to an 
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outside request, demand, or challenge. When important issues —say, of 
sovereignty or rights, national demands or interests, or of 
international image— are raised, the challenged state must take a 
stand and respond. Ignoring such challenges gives credence to the other 
claim or argument, and in the process, it weakens the credibility of 
the state to protect its own rights or to defend its claims (Rummel, 
1979). An example of this is the conflict between Britain and 
Argentina over the Falkland (Malvinas) islands and other smaller 
islands in the South Atlantic, just north of Antarctica. These remote 
islands, located off the eastern shores of Argentina, have for many 
decades been controlled by Britain. The islands, which are in fact 
remnants of the fading British Empire, were more or less forgotten by 
the Crown in London. On the other hand, Argentina, which once held 
these islands, decided unilaterally to "re-establish" sovereignty over 
them. In the early 1980s, Argentina, then led by a military 
government, appointed an administrator, and initiated radio and 
television broadcasts to the contested islands. These moves enraged 
the British government which, through mediators, got into some hastily 
arranged negotiations with the Argentinians, but to no avail. Neither 
side was prepared to compromise their position hence the escalating 
tensions quickly erupted into a war. 
Here is a case of a disrupted status quo due to violation of 
sovereignty; of a historic claim; and of a challenge to the 
international image and status of a country. The interests of one 
state were incompatible with those of its "neighbour". An Argentinian 
victory would have 1) meant greater domestic support for that country's 
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military government; and 2) it would have dealt Britain's international 
image a serious blow. Thus Britain felt compelled to respond. The 
relative speed in which this conflict escalated into a war is perhaps 
not typical. Having said that, the stages of opposing claims, 
negotiations, threats of reprisals, violent conflict (or war), conflict 
resolution, and then a return to the status quo are the basic 
evolutionary stages of any conflict and its resolution. 
The preceding pages and particularly this section, have illustrated 
the theory of conflict and identified its parameters. Having set the 
context for the theory, the next stage discusses the evolutionary 
process of conflict. 
2.3.2 The Process of Conflict 
Change is an inescapable development in the evolution of a state. 
Change, be it political, religious, economic, or social, tends to 
create tensions which have the potential of escalating to conflict. 
Diplomats or mediators may be able to pre-empt or put a quick end to a 
dispute. If they fail, a conflict may either stagnate unsolved, or 
escalate to bitter levels. The evolution of a dispute is greatly 
dependent upon the "importance of interests engaged," the impact on 
honor and credibility or international image (Rummel, 1979: 192-193). 
The latter is influenced by who the parties to the conflict are; a 
formerly passive neighbour, a competitor, or an enemy. Rummel (1976: 
265) breaks down the process of conflict into five phases: 
The first is the transformation of socio-cultural (conflict) 
space into opposing interests. The second involves the will's 
choice to manifest opposing interests and a consequent 
situation of uncertainty. The third is the resulting 
balancing of powers, may be manifested as conflict behaviour. 
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Figure 2.1 
THE PROCESS OF CONFLICT 
I Latent Conflict 
State; ideology; 
values; status. 
Opposing attitudes. 
Conflict Initiation 
Change; awareness; 
manifest of 
opposing interests. 
Situation 
of uncertainty; 
Will-to-conflict; 
preparations. 
Balancing of Power Balance of Power 
Coercive: 
non coercive: 
accomodations 
Credibility: 
interest: 
capability 
Resolution 
! 
V Disruption Phase 
Conflict manifest. 
Trigger/ disruptors^ 
Disrupted 
Expectations 
Incremental change 
in new structure 
of expectations. 
Status quo; 
New structure 
of expectations. 
Source: Adapted from Rummel, 1976 
manifesting their interests coercively or cooperatively. 
According to Rummel (1976: 268), a conflict begins to take shape 
when states become aware of their own and others long standing or 
evolving interests and needs. Awareness develops through the 
dissemination of information which can be manifest by cultural, 
political, or economic exchanges with one another. This awareness, 
which need not be realistic, has the ability to transform the hitherto 
veiled opposition into an opposing attitude. 
In an attempt to further self-interest, one becomes active in 
trying to influence the attitudes and perceptions of others — say of 
one's own superior or wife, political and religious groups or figures, 
or of entire populations. When states have false perceptions of one 
another it is largely due to propaganda, indoctrination and/or 
misinformation. For example, in the spring of 1986 the American 
government accused Libya of sponsoring state terrorism. Washington 
claimed that Tripoli was behind the bombing of a Berlin night club 
frequented by American troops stationed in that city "Irrefutable" 
evidence was later leaked by White House officials. Based on this 
evidence which apparently incriminated Libya, American bombers attacked 
various targets in Libya. A few months later, and in a court trial in 
West Berlin, Syria emerged as the facilitater of the initial bombing. 
The Manchester Guardian Weekly (28 December 1986: 16) noted that 
The American people now know, also, that some of the case 
against Libya consisted of "disinformation" leaked by the 
administration and unwittingly published by the press. 
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In spite of the American-Libyan fiasco, it must be noted that even when 
states are aware of each other and of their opposing interests, they 
may not feel compelled or pressured toward a confrontation or conflict 
(Wright, 1951). 
States' attitudes are actualized through awareness which, itself, 
becomes or induces mutually opposing attitudes. "Attitudes, however, 
are nonactive. They are dispositions without strength" (Rummel, 1976: 
269). Attitudes are stimulated and translated by states' needs for 
resources, their concern over territorial sovereignty, national 
security, or even political prestige. States' needs become the force 
that activates attitudes and transforms them into actual interests and 
then "into vectors of power" (Rummel, 1976: 269). Therefore, an 
interest that was once latent is being actively pursued now. 
At this early stage of conflict evolution, one can say that the 
evolving but hitherto stable interests lead to one states' awareness of 
each other, and of their incompatible interests. This is where the 
evolving interests of states are underscored, and their new attitudes 
are developed. 
Phase Two: Conflict Initiation. 
This phase moves conflict into the opposition stage. Preparations 
and overt actions set the stage for this phase. Countries with 
conflicting interests are always preparing both the people and the 
state (ie. its economy, army, emergency faci1ities.. .etc.) toward 
realizing the desired objective. These preparations "are made in an 
objective sense of uncertainty" (Rummel, 1976: 271). For example, 
Syria and Israel have different sets of incompatible interests for 
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which both states are always preparing their population to initiate 
conflict to fulfill their objectives. 
A conflict is initiated when (1) the states or individuals involved 
have the will-to-conflict or to manifest their opposing interests, and 
(2) when there exists a triggering event (Rummel, 1976). Once 
expressed, opposing interests move states further in the process of 
conflict hence initiating "active opposition" (Rummel, 1976; 1977; 
1979); a step that activates events. An example of that is the 
assassination of the Philippino opposition leader, Benino Acquino. This 
was the triggering event of the active opposition of the ruling 
government which eventually led to the ousting of Ferdinand Marcos. 
States are usually hesitant to manifest their incompatible 
interests by open conflict as this involves uncertainties and risks 
which must be carefully considered. A prerequisite to any decision that 
may lead to the initiation of open conflict is a careful evaluation of 
the benefits and costs of such a decision. This prerequisite is 
overwhelmed and biased by the subjective uncertainties of success that 
all states have (Rummel, 1976; 1979). For example, when Iran was 
invaded by Iraq in 1980, the latter was "certain" of a quick and 
decisive war in its favor. In retrospect, Iraq was neither certain of 
success nor did it accurately assess the new Iranian leadership's 
capability and attitude. Rummel believes that "subjective certainty" 
of success is different from "uncertainty" which is inherent in the 
situation (1976: 271). Rummel (1976) argues that while an "ultimate 
victory may be certain," neither the causes of war nor the immediate 
moves or responses of the opponent are predictable. 
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Therefore, at this stage of the conflict, the larger and more 
intense the latent but conflict-laden attitude becomes, the easier it 
is for states to find an excuse (a triggering event), to manifest their 
incompatible interests by initiating conflict. 
Phase Three: The Balancing of Power and Interests. 
In this phase, vectors of power get adjusted by coercive or 
non-coercive.means.' The outcome of this process is a balance of power 
between participants whether they be states, spouses, or animal groups. 
For example, states, especially the industrial powers, are always 
trying to balance their trade deficits. This is often pursued 
aggressively, sometimes necessitating radical trade measures which 
could lead to deterioration in inter-state relations. 
The balancing of power or interests involves testing of the status 
quo, manifestation of power, and finally conflict termination through 
force or accommodation. This process is detailed in figure 2.2. 
States have their idiosyncratic political and/or religious 
ideologies, socio-economic norms and practices. Initially, these 
factors influence relationships between states, and their perception of 
behaviour toward one another. This is also true in human behaviour. 
While a teacher is lecturing in a classroom, he may be confronted with 
some unattentive students. The teacher has two choices; either to put 
an end to the disturbance or ignore it at the risk of having it spread. 
The students' behaviour is a clear test of the status quo by 
challenging what they perceive as their teacher's interests, 
credibility, and capability. The teacher can protect his interests by 
exercising his capability hence asserting his credibility. However, 
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Figure 2.2 
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before taking a decision on how best to deal with the problem, the 
teacher, like the state, has to first gauge the behaviour of the actors 
involved, and then assess the costs and benefits of his potential 
response. 
Preliminary testing of the status quo may yield either that gains 
are compatible with the costs or that they are not. The latter case 
indicates that unacceptable risks are involved. In other words, what 
may be gained by disturbing a lecture may not be worth the cost of say, 
being suspended from the course. After this stage, actors become either 
accommodating or they reach an agreement that essentially supports the 
existing status quo (Rummel, 1976: 273). Therefore, we can say that a 
balancing of power may be achieved by only testing the status quo and 
then by reaching accommodations [see Figure 2.2]. 
As mentioned, however, status quo testing may yield that gains 
outweigh the costs or risks of the action taken. That might precipitate 
an actual confrontation; a coercive and/or a non-coercive one . An 
example of the latter occurred in 1984-1985 when the American microchip 
industry was being adversely affected by the flood of cheaper Japanese 
chips. In response, the American government threatened to erect high 
tariff walls in the face of the invading Japanese products. Eventually, 
they negotiated a "mutually agreeable" quota on US-bound computer 
chips. The Japanese favored a limited access to American markets to the 
possible loss of these markets and to avoid creating trade tensions 
between the two countries. Confrontations of this type, according to 
Rummel (1976: 274), "will manifest love, altruism, legitimacy, 
expertise, persuasion, rewards, and promises." When these interests or 
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powers are manifested, Rummel adds, "accommodations will be 
determined." 
Coercive confrontations are not eternal and ultimately lead to 
accommodations characterized by the victory of one interest over 
another. Obviously, coercive powers include threats or deprivations 
such as further torturing of political prisoners, or threats of 
socio-economic and political sanctions of a state or a person (Rummel, 
1976: 176-179 and 274). 
Some coercive situations necessitate that a choice between two 
alternative negative interests must be made. If a person, say, was held 
up by an armed mugger asking for his money and threatening his life. 
In this case, the choice is clear to most of us. 
Coercive confrontations are governed by the actors' credibility, 
interest, and capability. For example, depending on what is at stake, 
you may want to test the violent capability of the mugger; just how 
willing is he to use the weapon at hand? On the other hand, it is in 
the interest of the mugger to execute his threat because failing to do 
so will tarnish his credibility on the street and among his sub-culture 
"col leagues." 
All coercive confrontations tend toward two types of conflict: (1) 
Sociopolitical, including family and diplomatic disputes, and (2) 
manifestations of physical force such as sending an army to war. 
Sociopolitical conflicts include threats against the basic interests of 
at least one state hence forcing it to respond, usually with counter 
threats. The credibility of a threat-initiating state suffers if it 
does not defend its claim, or appear to have achieved certain desired 
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ends. In a situation of sociopolitical violence or conflict, states 
look for a negotiated settlement to their differences that will also 
accommodate their interests (Rummel, 1976). 
Sociopolitical violence may be insufficient to make one state give 
into the will and interests of another. Rummel (1976) notes that the 
use of physical force is the ultimate and usually the conclusive 
approach to decide upon states' conflicts of interests. It is applied 
only when one state takes on an unyielding position to the interests of 
another state. In this case the proponents of non-violent resistance 
contend that the victim country has in effect won a moral victory over 
the coercing state. When force is used, its use does not usually stop 
until one state (or its capability ) is defeated. The victorious 
country then imposes new rules, regulations, laws, and commands on the 
vanquished (Rummel, 1976). Both sociopolitical and physical forces 
have the same net result and that is a balance of powers between 
actors. 
Therefore, at this point of conflict evolution, states who are in 
pursuit of change are expected to test the status quo, evaluate the 
situation and their options (both internally and externally) and then 
choose the "best" response to the challenge, be it coercive or not. 
Phase Four: The Balance of Power. 
In this phase, a developmental process which influences the 
behavioral attitudes of states takes place. As a result norms, 
accommodations, understandings, and practices to govern are developed. 
The scope of this development which influences state expectations, is 
highly dependent on the triangle of credibility, capability, and 
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interests of states (Rummel, 1976: 279; Wright, 1951) [see Figure 2.1]. 
When this triangle reaches equilibrium, a balance of power is then 
established and a new structure of expectations has evolved. This 
equilibrium is usually reached when the conflict is resolved by 
coercive or non-coercive means. At this stage, states have overcome 
the initial misconceptions of one another and the miscalculations of 
each others potential. Such strategic policy errors were committed by 
Israel in its 1982 invasion and occupation of much of Lebanon. Then in 
1985 Israel withdrew all but one thousand of of its soldiers. This 
withdrawl was on the one hand, due to local and international pressure; 
and on the other hand, due to the massive human and economic losses the 
Israeli army had suffered. Instead, Israel reconsidered its policies 
and revived the local militia ("South Lebanon Army") so it can assume 
responsibility for the "vacated" region. In doing this, Israel had 
reduced its financial and personnel commitment in south Lebanon, and at 
the same time, it kept that area under occupation by proxy. 
The structure of expectations is, therefore, formed by the 
adjustment of one's capability and interests to those of others. Once 
formed, the structure of expectations becomes a dynamic system which 
gets altered, adjusted, or reinterpreted over time (Choucri and North, 
1975). 
The non-conflict interactions of states are influenced and 
sometimes shaped by their structure of expectations, status quo, and 
the existing balance of power. Through time,, however, peaceful 
interaction of states is threatened by one country's assessment of 
another; its behaviour, and rising domestic and foreign needs. 
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The structure of expectations has the tendency to become inactive 
or be disrupted (Rummel, 1976: 281). Expectations become inactive when 
interaction between the involved actors is halted. But if, at a future 
point in time these states renew their relationships and contacts, 
active competition and opposition will be triggered. This, however, 
usually results in a relationship that reaffirms or is based on the 
by-now established balance. This seemingly simple process can enter a 
level of complexity depending on just how much each state's 
capabilities and interests have changed. 
One can then say that this balance of power is a phase where a 
reconstruction and/or reinterpretation of the structure of expectations 
takes place. This is only possible if a regional (broad) equilibrium 
of interests, capabilities, and credibilities is reached. 
Phase Five: The Disruption Period. 
Peace is shaped (ie. threatened or enforced) by the evolving and 
naturally rising demands of states (Choucri and North, 1975; Wright, 
1951). As mentioned in the preceding phase, the balance of power is 
equivalent to the mutual interests, capabilities, and credibilities of 
the involved states. But as soon as interactions commence, states' 
expectations and subtle understandings become altered. Rummel (1976: 
281) contends that with the evolution of new capabilities and 
interests, concessions made between actors "may seem to have been 
extorted or unfair". Although the structure of expectations changes 
the quality of interactions, there is a tendency to maintain the same 
general structure. The main weakness of this position is that it is 
not accommodating; it does not account for the changes in interests, 
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capabilities, and the actual or potential challenge to the credibility 
of the state. We can, therefore, say that in this case the structure of 
expectations and the balance of power lag behind its base (Rummel, 
1976; 1977). 
The structure of expectations can then be divided into a congruent 
period and an incongruent one. The former period is one that reflects 
the balancing phase. While attempting to rebalance the changing 
expectations, new and accommodating expectations evolve. These changes 
are called disruptors which can "upset the structure of expectations at 
any time " (Rummel, 1976: 282), [see Figure 2.1]. 
An incongruent period is one that ignores the evolving new 
realities of interests, credibilities, and capabilities. In this 
period there is usually pressure to rebalance the existing power 
distribution because of the changing expectations of states. Despite 
the strain and tension, nothing changes because states, like people, 
are more willing to accept known problems than to risk unknown ones. 
What triggers the disruption period are explicit and "real" reasons 
to act, and not just simple frustration or dissatisfaction. A real 
cause or reason to act crystalizes a state's wi11-to-conf1ict hence 
another eruption of open conflict. In an incongruent period and as one 
ignores evolving realities (like that of rising expectations), a 
wi11-to-conf1ict evolves as well. There, the "final straw" is drawn 
when a trigger transforms dissatisfaction into opposition. Triggers are 
random events and their seriousness seem to correlate with the level of 
the preceding tension. 
In other words, the greater strain and tension are, the more likely 
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the status quo will be disrupted by something of apparent 
insignificance. For example, a routine question by a husband to his 
wife, like "when will dinner be ready?" may unleash a violent "I am not 
your slave." After that, the balance of power is re-established. 
The five evolutionary phases of conflict are a spiralling process 
of: conflict latency, uncertainty, balancing, balance, and then 
disruption. Two of these phases allow for conflict resolution. One is 
during the balancing of power, that is to pre-empt conflict and reach 
an accommodation. Another is during the disruption period, that is 
after conflict erupts. 
2.4 Conflict Resolution 
Because many variables influence a conflict situation, the process 
of its resolution is often extremely difficult. As mentioned earlier, 
once domestic and/or peaceful options for a state run out, it looks 
outwards for a solution. This may pertain to resource shortages, market 
protection, or the maintenance of one's economic and military 
advantage. Invariably, such a change in orientation creates tension 
and may lead to conflict (Coser, 1957). Two factors characterize 
resource-conflicts and complicate their resolution. First, the 
political (including military) future of some states is dependent on 
their continuous supply of certain strategic resources. Second, it is 
usually disadvantageous for any activator of a resource-conflict to 
make his motives public. As a result of both factors, the activating 
party either disguises its "real" motives (or goals) in the conflict, 
or it may pursue and advance its interests by directing an unpublicized 
war by proxy. 
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One avenue of conflict resolution is accommodation which is usually 
achieved through negotiations. In the pre-negotiation preparations, 
parties to a conflict try to (1) manipulate individuals, groups or 
governments to strengthen their negotiating position; (2) add or delete 
certain issues from the agenda; and (3) include or exclude "undesired" 
but potential participants from the negotiation process (Mitchell, 
1981). The last factor affects the relative status of a country and 
hence the potential outcomes of negotiations. 
In the pre-conflict negotiation stages, the issue of relative 
status is an acute one. A country's status might be determined by an 
arsenal of deterrent weapons; on the battle field; in an international 
forum like the United Nations; or by having a formidable economic base. 
In this context, Mitchell (1981: 208) notes that 
In many conflicts, the defined status of the parties, once 
generally accepted, has an important effect upon the relative 
position of advantage of the negotiators, on the way the 
subject matter to be negotiated is defined, and on the 
outcome of the discussions. 
As an illustration of this, the Palestine Liberation Organization's 
(PLO) mere willingness to hold talks with Israel implies the 
Organization's recognition of Israel and its sovereignty over all the 
territories it currently holds, including the occupied ones. The 
implications of this for the PLO amount to a contradiction of the basic 
tenet of the Organization; that is to establish a national homeland for 
the Palestinians on the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. On the other 
hand, an Israeli recognition of the PLO would amount to the former's 
willingness to bargain the occupied territories— which many Israelis 
perceive as the biblically promised land-- in exchange for peace. 
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Bargaining and negotiations are an approach that could lead to 
accommodating conflict resolutions. While capability and status affect 
the bargaining position of a state, its bargaining range may be limited 
by controlling the agenda. Although this option is open to all 
conflicting states, it is usually a tool of the currently advantaged 
party. "The basic process involves offering the benefits of 
negotiation on some relevant issues, at the cost of excluding others 
from consideration" (Mitchell, 1981: 215). 
Negotiation is a proven approach to conflict resolution. However, 
to assume that all conflict can be solved by negotiation, mediation or 
compromise is simply dangerous because it may lead the "aggressor to 
assume that what is his is his, and what is yours may be negotiable" 
(Rummel, 1981: 247). Therefore, there may be times when aggression has 
to be resisted to defend ones own territorial sovereignty as well as to 
test the will, capability, and interest needs of the aggressor. 
The mutual wills, interests, and capabilities of conflicting states 
are critical factors in the process of conflict resolution. This 
process is conceptualized within the following five approaches: The 
first approach asserts that once a conflict situation becomes clear and 
well defined, conflict intensity could be reduced, antagonists' 
expectations be made more realistic, and the balancing process of power 
be shortened. (Rummel, 1981). A look beneath a conflict may reveal the 
hidden or perhaps unconscious underlying goals of conflicting states; 
the covert stimulators of hostilities; or unveil the hidden or 
undeclared causes of conflict hence its resolution is made easier. 
A second approach to be considered in conflict resolution is to 
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break down a large interest into smaller ones. This approach, strongly 
emphasised by Fisher (1971), will make it easier to reach an agreement 
on several smaller issues than on a big one. Bargaining on some issues 
is then made for concessions on others. 
A third approach to conflict resolution is by invoking an 
overriding issue, usually related to morality and principle, that the 
antagonists can not ignore or dismiss. That overriding issue becomes a 
common goal of the actors. An example of that is a foreign conflict 
(against a "common enemy") unites the domestically conflicting or 
opposing parties. 
A fourth approach is by not relying exclusively on force as it 
would only buy the advantaged states an expensive and a temporary 
solution. Therefore, power should only be directed towards specific 
goals or- interests and used in proportional terms. 
A fifth and final approach to conflict resolution is by creating a 
distance in time and/or space hence some conflicts may fade away. This 
is possible only if the goals of the antagonists are not vital to their 
survival or damaging to their integrity. Separating antagonists by a 
space, demilitarized and monitored by international — like the UN — 
forces is a method of terminating conflict. Creating a distance 
between antagonists clearly requires the separation of actors — like 
troops, withdrawl of claims, and/or correction of attitudes. Rummel 
(1981: 247) believes that such an approach will over time allow 
the heat of battle to cool, rational perspectives on the 
issue to develop, and the underlying interests to change; or 
which gives each party an opportunity to satisfy 
independently their conflicting interests. 
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Rummel (1981), however, ignores the shortcomings of this approach, 
namely conflicts over dogmas or principles. Rummel's (1981: 247) last 
approach does lead to conflict termination, it however, does not 
resolve the underlying basis of that conflict. For example, UN troops 
in Cyprus have for over a decade been separating the Greeks from the 
Turkish Cypriots. Similarly, a UN buffer zone on the Golan Heights 
separates the Syrians from the Israelis. In spite of this, these 
conflicts still fester. 
Needless to say, the process of conflict resolution is rather a 
complex matter. This is due to the multiplicity of conflict causes and 
effects, and the involvement of many overt and covert elements (states 
and organizations) in a conflict. Thus there rarely exist simple 
solutions to conflicts. Indeed some leading scholars on conflict and 
war 1ike-Clausewitz, believe that conflict resolution is a far fetched 
concept. Rapoport, the editor of Clausewitz's classic On War (1985: 
424), notes that 
Nothing in Clausewitz's analysis corresponds to 'debate', 
since Clausewitz conceived conflict not as a search for truth 
or justice but only as a struggle of wills. The idea of 
conflict resolution is entirely foreign to his own way of 
thinking. 
In spite of the complexities of conflict resolution and the 
pessimism of Clausewitz's, the ultimate goal for the conflicting 
parties is to reach a non-imposed self-supporting solution which deals 
with al1 aspects of conflict, be it latent or covert. For the solution 
to be long lasting, it must clear the way for cooperation between the 
hitherto arch-enemies. 
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2.5 Summary 
States are future-oriented political entities with changing needs, 
interests, and capabilities. States must interact and compete in order 
to exist and prosper. Conflicts between states remain latent until the 
winds of political (eg. death of a leader), economic (eg. greater needs 
and limited supplies), or social (eg. a new ideology) change blow over 
the landscape. 
The seeds of conflict are sown when established accommodations are 
rejected due to the sweeping processes of change. A new awareness is 
developed and opposing attitudes are formed. State capabilities, 
triggered by an event, are used to manifest the opposing interests. 
Conflict then enters a period of uncertainty where the status quo is 
tested and a decision on conflict, accommodation, and/or non-conflict 
is taken. Regardless of the chosen path, the net outcome is a new 
structure of expectations and a balance of power: A balance of the 
triangle of interests, capabilities, and credibilities, which is in 
essence a re-establishment of a status quo. 
As mentioned earlier, states' needs are always changing thus 
straining the triangle of expectations which becomes increasingly 
incongruent. Whether the change of expectations is congruent or not, 
disruption is inevitable. This throws the situation back into the stage 
of uncertainty, where a new structure of expectations is formed, and a 
new status quo that balances states' interests, capabilities, and 
credibilities is established. In this web of conflict evolution, its 
causes and effects, conflict resolution may either pre-empt the 
eruption of conflict, or once it erupts to resolve it. 
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Conflict behaviour is manifested by the building and rebuilding, 
balancing and rebalancing of territorial space, interests, 
capabilities, and credibilities. Therefore, one can say that the 
evolutionary process of conflict is a spiral of uncertainty, balancing, 
balance, and disruption. 
The outcome of a conflict is, therefore, shaped by some 
inter-related factors: antagonists' goals and means of conflict 
manifestation; the duration and intensity of conflict. All these 
factors are dependent on available resources, feasibility of 
objectives, and the extent of "acceptable" sacrifices. Typically, the 
smaller the sacrifices, the more limited are the aims of the 
antagonists. The potential loser will then presumably find it easier 
to negotiate a resolution to the conflict. In spite of this, it is 
possible, to reach peaceful solutions acceptable to the antagonists 
without having a victor and a vanquished. 
This chapter discusses theoretically the issue of conflict, its 
development, evolution, and resolution. The motif is competition for 
resources and how it could lead states or people to conflict. The 
process of conflict has shown that advantaged states (economically, 
militarily, and politically) are less tolerant of conditions of 
resource scarcities as it might endanger their rank in the 
international community. The first of the subsequent two chapters 
discusses the causes, effects, costs, and the geopolitical implications 
of water scarcity in Lebanon and in Israel. The other chapter (five) 
attempts to analyse if and how the theory of conflict is or is not 
useful in explaining the Litani river dispute, and the "security belt" 
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in south Lebanon. The point of the exercise is to show if scarcity of 
water in the Middle East is a contributing factor to the current state 
of hostility between Lebanon and Israel. 
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C H A P T E R T H R E E 
An Historical Background to 
The Litani River Dispute 
This chapter traces Zionist historical efforts to either annex the 
Litani river's lower flow path (Upper Galilee region) to the mandate of 
Palestine, or to divert the river into the Jordan river system. 
Integral to this are details of the historical events that led to the 
current boundary line between Israel and Lebanon, essentially starting 
in 1916 and ending in 1948. The rest of the chapter is then divided 
into two major time periods: 1948 to 1966 and 1967 to 1978. The former 
focuses on the developments between Israel and Lebanon, as well as on 
the Jordan river dispute between Israel, Syria and Jordan. The latter 
focuses on the relationship between the Jordan water dispute and the 
1967 Arab-Israeli (Six Day) War. Also discussed is the Israeli creation 
of the the so-called "security belt" in the water-rich area of southern 
Lebanon. A concluding discussion draws the various points together 
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arguing that the scarcity of water in Israel is a contributing factor 
to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, to Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1978, 
and its continuous presence in south Lebanon's "security belt" ever 
since then. 
3.1 The Earlv Historical Period: 1905-1948. 
It is important to begin by clarifying the word "Zionism." It is 
derived from "Zion" 'which is the name given to what the Jews believe is 
their biblically "promised land" or "Eretz Israel" (i.e. the Land of 
Israel; Kimmerling, 1983: 1-8). Theodor Herzel, an Austrian writer and 
journalist, is regarded as the father and founder of the modern 
religiously based political phenomena known as Zionism. Although 
Herzel was a victim of rampant anti-semitic sentiments in Europe (just 
before and after the dawn of the 20th. century), he remained a secular 
Jew. Hence, his idea of a Jewish state was not religiously motivated 
but a mere response to Western anti-semitism (Dossa, 1986). One can 
then see why Herzel did not at first covet Palestine — The Holy Land 
— as a Jewish homeland. The Zionists later (at the turn of the 
twentieth century) chose to reconstruct a Jewish home in Palestine. In 
essence, then, Zionism attempts to gather world Jewry in a national 
"Jewish Homeland". Besides their "spiritual claims" over the promised 
land, the Zionists' choice of Palestine was influenced by economics, 
geopolitics, and by a misconception about the demography of the area 
(Kimmerling, 1983: 1-8). The early Zionists believed that Palestine 
was sparsely inhabited, if at all. Hence, their motto: "Land without 
people for the people without land" encapsualtes this view. 
Since about 1917, the Zionist movement has geographically included 
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the Litani basin in its definition of "Eretz Israel" (Stauffer, 1985). 
Diverting the Litani river of Lebanon into the Jordan to meet the long 
term irrigation and power needs of Palestine was first suggested in 
1905 by an engineer called N. Wilbush (Brawer, 1968: 234). Aware of 
the scarcity and economic value of water, the Zionist leaders of Europe 
actively lobbied the French and the British governments to adjust the 
northern and northeastern borders of Palestine so that it includes the 
i 
whole catchment of the Jordan river and a large part of the Litani 
river. Therefore, the Litani river and the "Northern Frontier of 
Palestine", a water-rich area, were in the lime-light well before the 
creation of the Jewish State. The process of drawing the boundary line 
between Lebanon and Palestine started in 1916 and continued until 1923. 
At that time, the Zionists were trying to convince the Mandate powers 
to adjust Palestine's northern frontier. 
The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 was the first attempt to 
partition the Ottaman Empire's territories between the European powers. 
They agreed to divide the "Arab Levant" (today's Syria, Jordan, Iraq, 
Israel, and Lebanon) into three spheres of influence: A British sphere 
or rather a small enclave encompassing the two coastal towns of Acre 
and Haifa, A French sphere with its southern boundaries delimited, more 
or less, just south of the current international boundary line between 
Israel and Lebanon; And an international sphere located south of the 
French one and surrounding the British "enclave." The international 
sphere was to be governed by an Allied Condominium. After years of 
negotiations and many territorial proposals and "compromises", France 
controlled Lebanon and Syria of today, and Britain controlled Iraq, 
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Palestine and Transjordan (ie. the territory on both sides of the 
Jordan river). According to Frederic Hof (1985: 7 ) , "The British had 
succeeded in getting Palestine for themselves through a combination of 
military superiority and Zionist Political support ... ." 
Shortly after the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the Zionist Organization 
(ZO), led by Lord Rothschild, extracted the famous Balfour Declaration 
of 1917. On the behalf of his government, Britain's Foreign Secretary 
Arthur James Balfour sent a written pledge to Lord Rothschild in which 
he stated Britain's willingness to assist the Zionists in establishing 
a Jewish "national home" in Palestine. Consequently, it was only 
natural for the ZO to support Britain in its bid to control Palestine. 
Once that was secured, the ZO lobbyed the British government to define 
the northern boundaries of Palestine according to the Organization's 
wishes. - As alluded to earlier, the Upper Galilee is a water-rich 
region, of paramount importance to the Zionists. However, unlike the 
Zionists, the British were indifferent to Palestine's northern 
boundaries and the river that it may have or not included (Hof, 1985). 
The peak of the world ZO's efforts in seeking "broader economic 
frontiers" for Palestine was during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. 
The ZO was then headed by the prominent Jewish Scientist Chaim Weizmann 
who had earlier secured Britain's sympathy to the idea of a Jewish 
homeland in Palestine. As the conference was entering its final stage 
of negotiations on the fate of Palestine, the ZO sought the support of 
of the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George. . In a letter to the 
Prime Minister, the ZO stated that due to topography of the Litani 
river's flow area, especially in its southern parts, the river's water 
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is "valueless to the territory north of the proposed frontier. They 
can only be used beneficially in the country much further south." 
(Weisgal, 1977: 267) The letter continued to suggest that best use of 
that river's, water was either for direct irrigation south of the 
proposed frontiers or for diversion into the Jordan river thus 
supplementing its flow so that irrigation and hydroelectric power 
generation downstream could be fostered (Weisgal, 1977: 266-267). 
Based on the reasons mentioned above, the ZO considered it 
"essential" for "the (Bekaa) Valley of the Litani, for a distance of 
about 25 miles above the bend," as well as the "Western and Southern 
slopes of Mount Hermon all be included in the Northern frontier of 
Palestine so that control of the headwaters of the Jordan is ensured" 
(Weisgal, 1977: 267). The eastern frontier was to include the Yarmouk 
river and to stretch southwards parallel to, but few kilometers west 
of, the Hejaz railway line (Weisgal, 1977). 
The Zionist proposal was, however, rejected by France which, in 
June 1920, proposed a boundary line that eventually became the 
internationally recognized one. It started just south of Ra's an 
Naqurah and proceeded eastward to then turn sharply northward to 
include the Jewish settlement of Metulla. This proposal left the 
entire Litani river within French held territory. 
Clearly angered by the latest French proposal, the Zionists sought 
to modify it so that the Litani could be salvaged. On the 30th of 
October 1920, and in the name of the Zionist movement, Dr. Weizmann 
wrote the following letter to Lord Curzon, Balfour's successor as 
Britain's Foreign Secretary: 
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Your Lordship, I am sure, realises the enormous importance of 
the Litany to Palestine. Even if the whole of the Jordan and 
the Yarmouk are included in Palestine, it has insufficient 
water for its needs. The summer in Palestine is extremely 
dry, and evaporation rapid and intense. The irrigation of 
Upper Galilee and the power necessary for even a limited 
industrial life must come from the Litany. Experts agree 
that the Litany is of little use to the well-watered Lebanon 
and we have always agreed that the requirements of the 
territory not included in Palestine should be adequately met. 
It is hardly possible that France even realises the extent to 
which the frontier she has proposed would cripple the 
economic life of Palestine. For if Palestine were cut off 
from the Litany, Upper Jordan and Yarmouk, to say nothing of 
the western shore of the Galilee, she could not be 
economically independent. And a poor and impoverished 
Palestine would be of no advantage to any Power (as quoted 
by: Hof, 1985: 11-13). 
Although Weizmann was successful in convincing the British to 
redemarcate the Northern Frontiers of Palestine, he failed to convince 
the French. The Franco-British Convention agreed in principle to the 
boundary line proposed by the French in June of 1920. Although the 
subject of water in the region was discussed at the Convention, there 
was no mention of the Litani river. The British-Franco Convention 
later established a joint boundary commission to demarcate the exact 
line between Lebanon and the emerging state of Israel. According to 
Hof (1985: 14), "the final boundary agreement," which was ratified by 
the British and the French and came into effect on the 10 March 1923, 
"made no further mention of Zionist access to French-controlled water". 
After the British-Franco agreement of 1923. the Zionists were 
beginning to lose hope of ever having even limited access to the 
Litani. In 1936 Zionist hopes were rekindled by a study on regional 
needs for electric power. The study, conducted for the American 
University of Beirut, suggested that electric power from the Litani 
could be generated to serve the the region of south Lebanon and 
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"possibly Safad in Palestine" (Hof, 1985: 30). 
In addition to that, in 1943 a joint study on the hydrology of 
southern Lebanon and northern Palestine was undertaken by a Jewish and 
a Lebanese engineering firm. This study assumed that Lebanon would use 
the Litani for irrigation purposes only. The study then concluded that 
since only one-seventh of the Litani could be usefully employed by 
Lebanon, most of the water should be diverted into Palestine (Schmidt, 
1955; Hof, 1985). All these hydrological studies and frontier 
proposals and counter proposals were solely aimed toward the 
realization of the Zionist dream of a "national Jewish home" in 
Palestine. That dream became a reality in May of 1948. 
3.2 The Period of 1948 - 1966 
Upon the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, the first 
Arab-Israeli war erupted. This raised the levels of tension and 
suspicion in the area, essentially foiling any possible cooperation 
between Israel and Lebanon. 
During that war, Zionist forces occupied an area in Lebanon 
adjoining the western bend of the Litani river. As a result of the 
1949 General Armistic Agreement (GAA) between Lebanon and Israel, the 
latter country's troops withdrew to the internationally demarcated 
boundaries of 1923. 
According to Berger (1965), Israel withdrew from South Lebanon in 
1948 because it believed that a formal peace treaty was possible. 
Thereafter, a joint exploitation of the Litani (based on the 1943 
survey) would be possible. Furthermore, the Israelis believed that 
territorial annexation of Lebanese territory might spark international 
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condemnation (Hof, 1985). Berger (1965, 30) then notes that "if they 
(the Israelis) had felt that... the Lebanese did not also consider the 
negotiations as the penultimate step towards peace they would never 
have withdrawn." 
Due to its delicate confessional political system and the currents 
of Arab nationalism that were emerging in the region, Lebanon could not 
even consider a water-sharing agreement or a separate peace treaty with 
Israel. Any such consideration would have constituted a break-away from 
the Arab sphere. This in turn would have had heavy political and 
economic costs that Lebanon was not willing or able to pay. 
Furthermore, "if Lebanon did sell water out of the country, past the 
eyes of the Shi'a farmers in the South who do not have irrigation 
water, there would be considerable local discontent" (Hudson, 1971: 
13). 
The developments of 1948-1949 foiled possibilities of a water 
sharing agreement between Israel and Lebanon which in turn prevented 
any large irrigation schemes from taking place in the Negev. However, 
"With or without Lebanese water, Israel was determined to make patches 
of the desert bloom" (Hof, 1985: 31). 
In order to accomplish this objective, Israel planned an extensive 
canal system to divert part of Jordan's water to the desert-like region 
in the south. As construction on the Canal [which was later called the 
'National Water Carrier'] commenced in September of 1953, Syria 
expressed its strong objection to the project. Syria's stand, which was 
supported by the United States, forced Israel to halt construction in 
October of 1953. In the same month the American President, Eisenhower, 
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sent his personal representative, Mr. Eric Johnston, to the Middle East 
hoping to transform the potentially explosive controversy over water 
into a "show case" of cooperation between the Arabs and Israel (Hof, 
1985). 
Negotiations over the allocation of surface water in the region 
were facilitated by the American envoy from 1953 till 1955. The "Main 
Plan", Johnston's initial water cooperation proposal, tabled in 1953, 
did not mention the Litani river "on the grounds that it is a Lebanese 
national river that could not be included in an international scheme" 
(Schmidt, 1955: 5). However, the Arab states and Israel rejected the 
Main Plan. The Israeli reason was the Plan's exclusion of the Litani 
river. 
Israel responded to the Main Plan by asking the American engineer, 
Joseph Cotton to study the situation. Cotton put forward his proposals 
which were a mere elaboration of Israel's earlier water negotiating 
position (Naff and Matson, 1984; Rizk, 1964). Although the disputed 
river was the Jordan, Cotton suggested, among other things, a peaceful 
sharing of the Litani waters for the purposes of power generation and 
irrigation in Israel. 
The Cotton Plan estimated that Lebanon needed only 50 % of the 
Litani river's water for irrigation. This Plan, like the 1943 report, 
assumed that Lebanon would harness the Litani's hydroelectric potential 
only in cooperation with Israel. Cotton recommended that one half of 
the Litani's annual flow of 850 million cubic meters (MCM) be diverted 
into the Jordan river. In return, Lebanon would receive hydroelectric 
power from Israel (Schmidt, 1955; Rizk, 1964). 
46 
The "Cotton Plan" was based on the combined annual flow of the 
Litani and the Jordan rivers which he estimated to be 2345.7 million 
cubic meters (MCM). Cotton then recommended that that water volume 
should be shared in the following way: 
1) Israel 1290.0 MCM. 
2) Lebanon 450.7 MCM. 
3) Syria 30.0 MCM. 
4) Jordan 575.0 MCM. 
TOTAL ... 2345.7 MCM. 
Source: Naff and Matson, 1984. 
After much negotiation, the "Main Plan" was amended and the 
"Johnston Plan" was reached. This Plan did not include the Litani 
river and gave Lebanon the right to utilize 35 MCM of the Jordan 
headwaters at the Hasbani tributary. 
Water Distribution According to 
The Johnston Plan 
Lebanon 35 MCM 
Israel 400 MCM 
Syria 132 MCM 
Jordan 720 MCM 
TOTAL 1257 MCM 
Source: Naff and Matson, 1984. 
This Plan was accepted by representatives of Israel and the Arab 
countries. It was, however, not "officially" accepted by the involved 
parties because that would have amounted to Arab recognition of Israel, 
and of Israel's renunciation of its historic claim over the Litani. In 
spite of this, the Plan was more or less adhered to by the riparian 
states, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. 
Israel's hope to share the Litani never materialized. Furthermore, 
Lebanon's negotiating position was strengthened by the release of a 
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report in 1954 by the U.S. Bureau of Land Reclamation. The report 
stated that Lebanon could usefully employ almost all of the Litani's 
water for both its irrigation and electric power needs (Schmidt, 1955: 
10). 
The loud Zionist and later Israeli claims for the Litani river, and 
their charges that the river is "useless" for Lebanon, and that its 
water is flowing "wastefully" into the sea prompted the Lebanese 
government to eliminate the pretext under which Israel could invade and 
occupy southern Lebanon. Such an Israeli move would be for the purpose 
of harnessing the irrigation and and power potentials of the Litani 
river. Hence in 1955 the Lebanese government took it upon itself to 
approve a large development plan called the "Litani Project". 
Initially, the Project was aimed at generating hydroelectric power. 
This objective was later modified to satisfy the irrigation needs of 
the southern Bekaa Valley and south Lebanon. However, the latter 
objective is yet to be implemented. The lack of implementation is 
partly due to Israel's threat "to use force against Lebanon to prevent 
the utilization of the Litani waters to develop South Lebanon" (Rokach, 
1986: xiv). 
Despite the initial political outcry by Syria over Israel's plan to 
divert part of the Jordan river southwards, Israel resumed construction 
on its "National Water Carrier" which was completed in 1964. The Arab 
states formulated a unified response to Israel's aggressive water 
policy. During an Arab Summit Conference in Cairo 1964, the Arab states 
decided to foil Israel's diversion plan by diverting the Jordan river's 
tributaries (the Hasbani and the Banias rivers) for the purposes of 
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irrigation in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon (Smith, 1966). 
The rugged terrain would have rendered the diversion of the Banias 
into the Yarmouk a difficult technical task. However, diverting the 
Hasbani into the Litani would have been easier as both river's are only 
5 km apart. Had the diversion been successful, it would have reduced 
the flow of the Jordan river substantially thus thwarting Israel's 
water policy to irrigate the Negev. 
Lebanon reluctantly accepted the Summit's controversial resolution. 
Not wanting to be politically and economically isolated from the Arab 
world, Lebanon began implementing its part of the diversion project in 
the early summer of 1965. According to Bar-Yaacov, the Israelis 
notified the Lebanese government that they were determined to stop the 
diversion scheme, even if Israel had to use its military force 
(Bar-Yaacov, 1967: 148). In July of 1965 Lebanon chose to cease 
working on the diversion project. Israel's intent to stop the project 
was underscored by its intermittent attacks on the Syrian diversion 
site at Banias (Hof, 1985). 
3.3 The Period of 1967 - 1978 
A number of observers believe the tensions that arose from the 
water dispute were a major contributing factor to the 1967 Six Day War 
which put a sudden and a final end to Arab river diversion plans (Hof, 
1985; Stauffer, 1982). 
The 1967 war involved three of Israel's four Arab neighbours, all 
of whom lost territory as a result of the conflict. Lebanon was the 
only notable exception. Its frontier remained quiet and hence 
unchanged. In the aftermath of the 1967 war it was quickly observed 
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that the Hasbani river of Lebanon was the only tributary to the Jordan 
river that was not in Israeli controlled territory. This prompted the 
victorious Defence Minister of Israel, Moshe Dayan, to declare that his 
country had achieved "provisionally satisfying frontiers, with the 
exception of those with Lebanon" (Cooley, 1978: 3). 
Dayan's statement was followed by Israel's renunciation of the 
General Armistic Agreement with Lebanon. Furthermore, Israel's Prime 
Minister Levi Eshkol was quoted as saying that the thirsty state of 
Israel cannot sit idle while the Litani flows "wastefully" into the 
Mediterranean (le-Monde. 8 September, 1967). All of these declarations 
led the Lebanese to conclude that Israel intended to invade and occupy 
parts of south Lebanon to at least incorporate the remaining headwaters 
of the Jordan river (Jureidini and Hazen, 1976), and at most to annex 
the southern flow area of the Litani. 
In the spring of 1964, Israeli officials debated the "size" of 
their young state and responsibility for "losing" the Litani. While Ben 
Gurion expressed his regrets for losing the Litani, Israel's Labour 
Minister, Yigal Allon, charged angrily that one more day of fighting in 
the 1948 War would have enabled the Israeli Army to "liberate the 
entire country" from the Litani river in the north to the Sinai desert 
in the south-west (Times {London], 9 March, 1964: 8). 
The water disputes of the 1950s are believed to have contributed to 
the 1967 War (Hof, 1985; Stauffer, 1982 and 1985). In spite of the 
debate in Israeli political circles about the size of the "entire 
country", and Israel's ability to have successfully fabricated a 
pretext to occupy South Lebanon in June of 1967 (Hof, 1985), Israel 
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opted not to delimit the Litani as its northern boundary. 
Israel's restrained behaviour towards Lebanon is due mostly to the 
following factors: first, the newly occupied territories augmented 
substantially. Israel's fresh water supply by up to forty percent. 
Second, Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights (where the Banias 
tributary originates) rendered the Hasbani diversion plan impossible, 
and served Lebanon a stern warning-by-example. Third, Hof (1985: 38) 
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contends that "An Israeli seizure of southern Lebanon could have 
provoked international outrage and condemnation without significantly 
enhancing Israel's economic prospects". 
The relative passivity of Israel's policy toward Lebanon took a 
downturn in 1969. The proximate reason for Israel's violent retribution 
against the southern Lebanese was the Palestinian "threat" to northern 
Israel. However, it is "reasonable to suggest", Hof writes, "that the 
prolonged Zionist frustration over the issue of water contributed to 
the violent tenor of subsequent Israeli actions in southern Lebanon" 
ever since the late sixties (Hof, 1985: 39). 
One year after the civil war erupted in Lebanon, Israel initiated a 
more active policy toward south Lebanon. On July 1976, the Israeli 
government decided upon a "new comprehensive security" policy for its 
northern settlements. This policy viewed the pacification of southern 
Lebanon as the key to peace and security in the area (New York Times, 
20 July, 1976: 3). This new policy approach, called "the good fence 
program", stressed humanitarian relief to villagers who were finding it 
increasingly difficult to travel northwards. Another aspect of the 
policy was the creation of a pro-Israeli militia to help prevent 
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Palestinian guerillas from reaching Israel's border. The "good fence 
policy" was also the first open Israeli involvement in the economic, 
social, and political affairs of Lebanon. 
Then, in. 1978, Israel invaded South Lebanon and established a 
"security zone". It is a strip six to fifteen kilometers in width 
extending along Israel's entire northern frontier with Lebanon. This 
belt is narrow in the west and widens as it moves toward the east and 
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north east until it reaches the western bend of the Litani river [see 
Figure 4.1]. This self-declared belt was turned over to Major Saad 
Haddad, a renegade Christian Lebanese Army Major. He established and 
led the South Lebanese Army (SLA). Both the belt and the SLA are now 
led by Haddad's successor, Anton Lahd. The SLA which numbers about two 
thousand men today, is trained, equipped, and paid by Israel. Hence it 
acts as Israel's proxy power in southern Lebanon. 
In retrospect, Israel's policy towards South Lebanon seems to have 
been cemented in the mid-1950s. At this time, Israeli politicians were 
discussing the most appropriate policy toward Lebanon. The former 
Israeli Prime Minister, Moshe Sharett, quoted in his diary the 
country's Chief of Staff, Moshe Dayan as saying: 
the only thing that's necessary is to find an officer, even 
just a Major. We should either win his heart or buy him with 
money, to make him agree declare himself the savior of the 
Maronite population. Then the Israeli army will enter 
Lebanon, will occupy the necessary territory, and will create 
a Christian regime that will ally itself with Israel. The 
territory from the Litani southward will be totally annexed 
to Israel and everything will be all right (as quoted by 
Rokach, 1986: 26). 
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Therefore, with the Christian-headed security belt, Israel once again 
has, and for the first time since 1948, secured an access to a new 
water resource, the Litani river. 
Israel's biggest ever invasion of Lebanon occurred in June 1982. A 
few months later, the Minister of Science and Technology, Yuval Neeman, 
conceded that "Israeli engineers had carried out seismic soundings and 
tests near the Litani' s westward bend", an area which is said to be 
"the ideal place for a diversion tunnel which would only need to be 
about three miles long to reach Israel's Huleh water system" (Cooley, 
1983: 11). 
It must be noted that the "security belt" is viewed by some as just 
that: a mere buffer zone between Israel and the "hostile" forces — 
both Lebanese and Palestinians— in south Lebanon. This is a shaky 
claim at best as it does not consider or account for the historical 
context of the Lebanese Israeli conflict. What can not be ignored is 
Israel's firm hegemony over the "belt", a task carried out by the SLA 
and about one thousand Israeli army "advisors". Both of these parties 
are hardly confined to the "security belt" zone. Their area of 
operation and influence tends to expand and contract depending on the 
situation. 
These facts not only confirm Lebanon's worst fear (of Israel's need 
for the Litani water) but have led to the following tangible 
conclusions: Since 1978 it has been reported that both Saad Haddad and 
his successor, Anton Lahd, had put an end to all new well digging and 
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in some instances they ordered existing wells to close (Naff and 
Matson, 1984). Furthermore, Lebanon's allocated share of the Hasbani 
river by the Johnston Plan now flows into Israel (Naff and Matson, 
1984). 
3.4 Summary 
From this chapter it is clear that Israel has had a long standing 
interest in the Litani river of Lebanon. Towards this end, Israel has 
attempted various approaches, most recent of which has been her 
creation of the "security belt." This belt has already resulted in 
some tangible water returns for Israel. But what is the long-term value 
(ie. cost and benefit) of this.- water-rich "belt" to Israel? Does 
Israel really need to import water? If so, why from Lebanon? Is water a 
transferrable resource? These questions and others pertaining to the 
current state of water supply and demand in both Israel and in Lebanon 
will be addressed in the following chapter. 
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C H A P T E R F O U R 
The Hydro-politics 
of 
South Lebanon 
This chapter sets to establish a case of water scarcity in Israel, 
and the socio- political implications of this incipient water crisis. 
First, the geography of Lebanon and Israel is discussed, with an 
emphasis on the hydrology of both countries An analysis of the water 
problem follows. This is achieved using data on water supply and 
demand, the quality, quantity, and sources of the available water. 
Domestic and foreign water-augmenting options being pursued by Israel 
are then discussed and evaluated. This leads to the discussion of the 
socio-economic and political values attached to water in both Lebanon 
and Israel. The chapter concludes that the "lure of the Litani" is too 
great to be overlooked by Israeli geostrategists and water planners. 
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4.1 The Geographical Setting 
4.1.1 Israel 
Both Lebanon and Israel are similar in that they both have climatic 
regions ranging from wet to arid, and both have typically Mediterranean 
climates— hot and dry summers, and mild rainy winters. However, the 
Israeli case is more extreme. Over 50% of the country is covered by the 
southern Negev desert. Precipitation ranges from 1000 mm per year in 
Safad (north), 500 'mm in Tel Aviv (coast), 200 mm in Beersheba (south 
central), and only about 30 mm in Eilat, the most southern tip of the 
Negev desert (Pohoryles, 1975: 1). There is, therefore, a dramatic 
decrease in rainfall from north to south. A similar but less dramatic 
decrease occurs from west to east. 
The raised areas of the country have a north-south orientation with 
a tendency to drop in elevation as they stretch southwards. Hence 
Lebanon's mountain ranges become hills in Israel. Accordingly, 
precipitation is influenced by the landscape relief; whereby the 
western slopes receive more rain than do the areas in the "rain shadow" 
or on the leeside of the hills. Moreover, the angle of the slope is 
also a factor that affects the precipitation level. The steeper the 
ascent, the smaller the area where the amount of rain yielded by the 
cooling of the air concentrates. 
Israel's only major river with an almost constant annual flow 
(about 1900 million cubic meters, MCM) is the Jordan river. The 
headwaters of the Jordan river are in Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, and in 
the occupied Golan Heights of Syria. Although over 70% of the river's 
annual flow originates in Arab countries, Jordan and Israel are the 
main beneficieries of the river. There are other perennial streams in 
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Israel such as: the Yarkon which empties near Tel Aviv, and Hadera 
which empties between Tel Aviv and Haifa. The flow of these streams is 
reduced to a trickle in the dry summer season. In spite of this, these 
streams and others are integrated into the huge National Water Carrier 
which transports and distributes water to the urban centers on the 
coast and the agricultural land in the south and east. The complete 
utilization of the water resources in Israel renders some river beds, 
such as the Yarkon, as "reservoirs" of sewage or as sea water marshes 
(Orni and Efrat, 1966: 44). 
Lake Tiberias, also known as sea of Galilee or as lake Kinneret, is 
Israel's main reservoir of fresh water with an estimated capacity of 
3000 MCM. The lake, deepest in its north east (49 meters), is also the 
issuing point of the National Water Carrier [see Figure 4.1]. Lake 
Tiberias . is 165 square kilometers (km) in area and is 213 meters 
beneath the Mediterranean Sea level. The Jordan river and other 
smaller streams empty into lake Tiberias. Despite this, the lake is 
relatively saline. Its Chloride content ranges from 250 milligrams (mg) 
per 1 iter to 400 mg/1. 
4.1.2 Lebanon 
In Lebanon, two mountain chains run parallel to the coast, with the 
Bekaa Valley in between. These mountains are as high as 3090 meters in 
the north, and they drop in elevation as they stretch southward. 
Precipitation in these mountains ranges from 900 to 2000 mm/yr; over 
800 on the coast and in the southern Bekaa, and less than 300 in the 
northern Bekaa. The climatic conditions in Lebanon are typically 
Mediterranean; short rainy winters, and long dry summers. Such a 
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Figure 4.1 
The Basin of the Jordan and Litani Rivers 
10 miles 
fiiliggj Security Belt 
Official Zionist Boundary Proposal,1919 
Sources: HOF, 1985; Drysdale & Blake, 1985; 
The Economist. Sept. 27, 1986. 
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climate clearly affects the flow of rivers, many of which tend to 
either dry up or to have a greatly reduced flow in the summer. 
The Litani river springs from a point 10 km west of the city of 
Baalbeck at an elevation of 1000 meters above sea level. From there the 
river flows southwards through the fertile Bekaa Valley for a distance 
of 130 km before it turns west and flows for another 40 km until it 
reaches the Mediterranean sea, a short distance north of Tyre. The 
basin of the Litani river (2170 km squared in area) lies completely 
within Lebanon. The flow of the river at the Karoun dam (which has the 
capacity to conserve 200 MCM) averages 410 MCM/yr; a flow that may vary 
from year to another by 300 MCM/yr. Near the town of Khardali at the 
western bend of the Litani [Figure 4.1], the average flow of the river 
is 650 MCM/yr, with a variation of 400 MCM/yr over a number years. 
Unlike the Litani, the Hasbani river springs from south east 
Lebanon and flows southwards to become a tributary to the Jordan river 
[Figure 4.1]. The Hasbani's average flow is 157 MCM/yr. Although the 
flow in both the Litani and the Hasbani rivers is continuous, it has 
the tendency to fluctuate from month to month, and from year to year. 
The high rate of water consumption in Israel, has largely had 
negative impacts on water quality, as well as simultaneously limiting 
supply and increasing demand. The current water crisis in Israel and 
the country's historical interest in the Litani water has created 
jitters in Lebanon since 1978. 
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4.2 Israel's High Water Consumption: An Analysis 
There is a general consensus among hydologists and water managers 
in Israel that the country is currently developing all of its 
replenishable .water stock. In fact, the gap between water demand and 
supply has been widening. It is, therefore, imperative to analyse the 
factors that led to this situation. This is accomplished within two 
broad frameworks, one of which is demographic and cultural, and the 
other is ideological and agricultural. 
4.2.1 Demography and Culture. 
Prior to the establishment of Israel in 1948, Zionists popularized 
the theme of "a people (the Jews) without a land returning to a land 
(Palestine) without a people" (Kimmerling, 1983: 9). The Zionists soon 
discovered that Palestine was not only inhabited by more people than 
they had anticipated (Kimmerling, 1983: 9 ) , but much of the land was 
under (largely dry) cultivation. 
After the inception of Israel, thousands of Jews from around the 
world responded to Zionist calls and returned to "the Promised Land" 
[see table 4.1 and 4.2]. 
60 
Table 4.1 
Sources of Population Increase 
in Thousands 
Period Pop. at Pop. at 
beginning end of 
of period period 
Total Yearly % of 
increase % of migration 
increase balance 
of total 
increase 
1948-60 805.60 
1961-71 2150.40 
1972-82 3115.60 
1983-84 4033.70 
2150.40 
3120.70 
4063.40 
4199.70 
1344.8 7.6 
901.8 3.4 
948.1 2.4 
166.0 1.3 
64.6 
37.7 
19.3 
14.9 
Source: Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, No.36, 1985: 
33. 
Table 4.2 
Jewish Immigration By Continent Of Origin 
in percent 
Time Period Europe America Africa Asia 
1919-1931 
1932-1938 
1948-1951 
1952-1959 
1975-1981 
81.2 
86.8 
47.6 
32.1 
60.1 
2.5 
2.3 
0.7 
3.4 
24.0 
0.7 
0.6 
13.7 
51.96 
5.2 
8.9 
8.3 
34.6 
12.4 
10.3 
Source: Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, 
No.33. 1982: 134-135. 
The bulk of the early immigrants came from Developed "Western" 
countries: largely from Europe and North America, and less so from 
Australia and South Africa. These predominantly "Western" settlers 
"had different (higher) water consumption habits than the indigenous 
population" (Naff and Matson, 1984: 33). 
Since 1919, the majority of immigrants to Israel have, by and 
large, been Ashkenazi Jews (i.e. those from Europe, America, Australia, 
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and South Africa —"developed") [Table 4.2]. Until the late 1960s, 
Ashkenazis constituted over one half of the total Jewish population 
(Orni and Efrat, 1966: 201-202). On the other hand, the Oriental or 
Sepharadi Jews (those from Asia and North Africa —"less developed") 
constituted 9.8% of the population in 1948 and 28.7% in 1964 (Orni and 
Efrat, 1966: 201-202). Since then, the Ashkenazi Jews have been 
steadily out-numbered by the Oriental Jews. This is largely due to the 
latter group's high birth rates. 
Labour statistics from 1950 show that 30 % of the civilian work 
force (most of whom were Ashkenazi immigrants) had technical and 
industrial skills (Naff and Matson, 1984: 33). Most of the remaining 
population was placed in already established villages and in new 
agricultural settlements. They were given on-the-spot training as 
farmers.. So the early Jewish immigrants were able to lay the 
foundations of an industrial and a rapidly developing Israel, hence 
creating a higher standard of living than its neighbours. This, coupled 
with the large number of farming immigrants translated into a greater 
demand for water. 
As shown in table 4.3, domestic water consumption in Israel is more 
than fives times higher than that in Jordan, and about three times 
higher than Lebanon. Similarly, the Israeli newspaper Davar (26 
November, 1978, as quoted by Kubursi, 1982: 82) reported a wide gap 
between the per capita water consumption of Jewish settlers on the West 
Bank and the Arab population in the same region; the former consuming 
100 cubic meters annually, and the latter 40 cubic meters. After 1967, 
Israeli authorities imposed new strict water regulations on the 
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residents of the West Bank. Permits to drill water wells in Arab areas 
were rarely given, and even then only for domestic purposes. This new 
policy, according to Davar (26, November, 1978), was meant to minimize 
any interference with the water being pumped to Israel proper from Arab 
areas. So in 1977 and on the occupied West Bank, 17 wells supplying 
Jewish settlements (then inhabited by less than 30,000 Israelis) 
extracted 14 MCM/yr; 88 Arab wells (Palestinians then numbered about 
600,000) were permitted to pump a mere 9.9 MCM/yr (Kubursi, 1982: 82). 
This pattern of high water consumption rates domestically is due to 
the socio-economic background of the Ashkenazi Jews and to their high 
standard of living. European Jews tend to have swimming pools, green 
lawns, and running water in their homes in Israel. These reasons and 
others account for the high rate of domestic water consumption. 
Table 4.3 
Comparative Water Consumption 
[Figures in MCM] 
Sector Israel Jordan Lebanon * 
Irrigation 1295 465 670 
Domestic 332.5 60 135 
Industrial 122.5 30 65 
TOTAL 1750 555 870 
Source: Naff and Matson, 1984. 
*.Source: al-Nahar. 5 August, 1985. 
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Table 4.4 
Water Consumption in Israel 
in MCM 
055 
075 
095 
090 
109 
103 
103 
1075 
1249 
1328 
1235 
1212 
1282 
1255 
Year Total Domestic Industry Agriculture 
1958 * 1274 196 
1964-65 1329 199 
1969-70 1564 240 
1975-76 1728 305 
1979-80 1700 375 
1980-81 1679 367 
1981-82 1770 385 
1982-83 1759 401 
Sources: Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, No.36, 
1985: 452. 
* Darr et. al, 1976. 
Although the Oriental wave of Jewish immigrants brought Israel many 
unskilled hands, they generally avoided the agricultural sector. 
Israeli .farmers need to have some basic technical skills and possess 
the capital to invest in a large farm. Capital, farm size, and farm 
technology affect the feasibility, yields, and competitiveness of 
farms. 
4.2.2 Zionism and Agriculture 
Zionism is the political ideology of the current Jewish state of 
Israel. Decades before the establishment of Israel in Palestine, 
Zionism had the theme of "Jews on the land" Consequently a strong 
emphasis on agriculture. The very early Zionists established their 
roots and influence in historic Palestine by purchasing arable land and 
establishing farms "in areas which were only sparsely populated by 
Jews." (Kimmerling, 1983 87) According to Kimmerling (1983 87), 
the aim of these agricultural settlements (or Kibbutz) was to create 
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fait accomplis before the question of Palestine was determined by the 
United Nations (UN). Therefore, it was not always economics but 
geopolitics that determined the location of the Kibbutz. Most of the 
land purchased in Palestine was done through or for the Jewish National 
Fund. By 1939, the Jews had acquired 10 percent of Palestine, seven 
percent of which was cultivable (Kimmerling, 1983: 89). 
4.2.2.1 The Economic Viability of Subsidised Agriculture. 
The ideological commitment to agriculture was initially intended to 
make the new immigrants feel "rooted" in their new home— Israel; to 
secure the "territorial integrity" of the country by firmly occupying 
the peripheral areas; to make the state self sufficient in food (for 
security reasons); and to expand the carrying capacity of the land so 
it could accommodate larger numbers of immigrants. 
Food self sufficiency was of particular concern to Israel when the 
state was in its infancy years and its population was swelling with 
immigrants [see tables 4.1 and 4.2]. This concern is no longer a valid 
one as the country is now a net exporter of food. Israeli fruits and 
vegetables are exported to the markets of the European Community (EC) 
and to the distant markets of North America. 
Israel's agricultural accomplishments were made possible by 
substantial government subsidies. Farmers enjoy "cheap or free 
infrastructure, tax remissions, special credit facilities and export 
assistance" (Stauffer, 1985: 77). Moreover, the cost of Irrigation 
water is highly subsidised. In the mid-1970s, Israeli farmers' water 
supply was up to three times cheaper than water for any other sector. 
This is a significant factor because agriculture consumes over 70% of 
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the total water stock of the country. Israeli agronomists, according 
to Stauffer (1985, 77), estimate that less than one half of the 
country's irrigated agriculture is economically productive and a 
"fraction" of its agricultural production is economically viable; "the 
rest requires not only water but steady injections of cash subsidies." 
This is due to the negative "added value per unit of water for 
about half of the agricultural output" (Stauffer, 1982: 46-48). 
Therefore, economically, Israel would have benefited more 
"if it had cut back on costly, highly subsidised agriculture, 
rather than capturing still more Arab water with which to 
expand its inefficient agricultural output" (Stauffer, 1985: 
77). 
Stauffer (1985; 1982) then argues that the value of the coveted 
additional water is merely ideological and not economic. 
4.2.2.2 Ideology and Israel's Water Policy 
The water policy of Israel is still influenced by the ideological 
fundamentalists of the state. The water policy in Israel was guided by 
Zionism until 1964 after which the role of ideology was dampened. 
Therefore, the period of ideological supremacy was between 1948 and 
1964 after which (1965 till present) ideology became more pragmatic. 
In the first period of 1948-1964, the pattern of water distribution 
and development was as follows: "ideology dictated policy and policy 
guided the planning and operations of the water institutions" (Galnoor, 
1980: 293). The most important of these institutions are Tahal (water 
planning for Israel), and Mekorot; both of which are government 
dominated. The strong ideological influence necessitated greater water 
development hence their engineering-access orientation. In this 
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period, "No plan for a new agricultural settlement was ever abandoned 
only because the cost of supplying water was too high" (Galnoor, 1980: 
293). The Israeli government, the sole owner of all water resources in 
the state after the 1959 "Water Law", was subsidizing water cost thus 
providing the resource far below its real cost of supply. Therefore, 
Galnoor (1980: 306) asserts, "Diseconomies dictated by ideology" and 
manifested in subsidised water costs, "could (temporarily) be tolerated 
under conditions of conventional (even if merely perceived) water 
sufficiency." This, however, could not continue indefinitely. 
In the period 1965 to the present, the ideological component of 
water policy started to wear off. This may have been due to two 
factors: Firstly, the National Water Carrier, completed in 1964, 
transported water to more communities in central and southern Israel 
thus leaving less water to go around; and secondly, the Israelis 
realized the scarcity and value of water when the neighbouring Arab 
states vowed, in effect, to reduce the flow of the Jordan river to a 
trickle. So it was "Water constraints that exerted strong pressure 
toward the modification of the of previous ideological imperatives" 
(Galnoor. 1980: 297). 
Despite this pressure, ideological objectives are still being 
achieved within the limitations of water development, and the water 
policy is such that agricultural interests prevail. In the mid-1960s, 
agricultural water consumption had to be drastically curtailed [see 
Table 4.4] so that domestic (urban) and industrial needs could be 
satisfied When this issue emerged, the Ministry of Agriculture found 
it very difficult to endorse openly a policy of adjusted reallocation 
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of water from the agricultural sector to other growing and needy 
sectors. Hence "the policy of assuring priority for the water needs of 
urban and industrial growth was started in general terms" (Galnoor, 
1980: 298-299). As a result, some fundamental ideological questions 
were raised which affected the structure of political power. 
In spite of the looming water crisis, ideology was still a shaping 
factor of water policy in Israel. In a 1978 article, Galnoor (1980: 
297-298) wrote that the quantity of water for irrigation could not 
continue rising at the previous rates. He went on to say that "Such a 
change in the ideological component of water policy" is yet to occur. 
It must be acknowledged that as the gap between water supply and 
demand widens, attempts are being made to reallocate agricultural water 
[see Table 4.4; note the years 1979-1980 where 75 MCM were reallocated 
to the domestic and industrial sectors]. These attempts are quickly 
overridden when drought strikes Israel. This happened in 1981-1982 with 
agriculture prevailing once more. 
It is now clear how demographic composition and societal evolution 
contribute to the high rate of water consumption in Israel. Moreover, 
ideology remains an integral component of water policy; one that favors 
the agricultural sector and subsidizes its water supply. As a result 
of this high rate of water consumption, water quality is in a state of 
degradation. 
Specifically, water quality has been of concern in Israel since the 
mid-1950s. This issue was highlighted in the Cotton Plan which 
suggested the diversion of one third of the Litani river's good quality 
water into the Jordan river system Among other things, this was 
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supposed to reduce the salinity at lake Tiberias by diluting its water 
(Stevens, 1965). The rapid degradation of the water stock has 
certainly affected Israel's water policy. Salinity and pollution are 
the two main problems that water planners have to control and 
ameliorate. 
Salinity is a problem not only in Israel's aquifers but also in the 
country's surface water system, especially in lake Tiberias, Israel's 
largest fresh water reservoir. Salinity in lake Tiberias is caused by, 
first, the rate of precipitation per season. As more water enters the 
lake, the lower the salt content is. So the seasonally fluctuating 
salinity level is high in the dry summers, and lower in the wet 
winters. A second reason for lake Tiberias salinity is the high rate 
of water evaporation due to the sunny and warm weather. A third reason 
is the mineral (salty) springs at the bottom of the lake and on its 
banks (Orni and Efrat, 1966: 78). 
The Israeli representative to the conference on Water For Peace 
(1967, vol.2) noted that water in lake Tiberias contains about 1000 ppm 
of total dissolved solids, of which chloride accounts for 365ppm. He 
also said that the brackish aquifer in the Negev desert contains upto 
3000 ppm of total dissolved solids. Currently, the acceptable level of 
chloride concentrated in agricultural water is 170-250 mg/1 (Waldman 
and Sheval, 1985: 438). As for drinking water, the Israeli government 
has recommended that the maximum concentration of chlorides be set at 
250 mg/1 (Shuval, 1980: 315-337). 
As the concentration of chlorides in Israel's water rises, so does 
the concentration of sodium (salt). In the past, the level of salt 
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concentration in potable water was judged by personal objectionable 
taste. Recently, however, the high sodium concentration in water is 
said to have direct health affects as it is viewed as a possible cause 
of hypertension (Shuval, 1980: 315-337). 
Another form of water contamination is the accumulation of 
nitrates. This type of water pollution is primarily derived from human 
activities as nitrogen salts are rarely found in appreciable quantities 
in natural water. Studies of the water quality of Israel's main 
coastal aquifers showed that the intensive use of nitrogen fertilizer 
in agriculture is a major contributor to this type of pollution. 
Nitrogen fertilizers are the source of 60% of the nitrate level found 
in ground water; 10% from irrigation using reclaimed waste water and 
refuse disposal; another 16% of added nitrates was traced to local well 
irrigation, a water source already contaminated with nitrates; and the 
remaining 14% is from a variety of sources including sanitary land 
fills, nitrogen in rain water, urban return flow, and live stock 
excretions (Mercado, 1980: 93-146). 
The discussion above identifies the causes and some of the problems 
associated with the over exploitation of Israel's existing water 
supplies in order to meet her risisng water needs. The following 
section explores Israel's options to acquire new sources of water. 
4.3 Passive Acquisition of New Water Resources 
Although Israel's water demand has been rising, the country's 
supplies have been fixed since the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. Israeli 
Scientists have, for many decades, been looking for scientific answers 
to their country's incipient water crisis. Importing water from the 
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Nile is another potential solution to the country's water problems. 
The following section looks into Israel's water alternatives which are 
broken into two broad categories, one domestic and the other a foreign 
alternative. 
4.3.1 The Domestic Prescription 
The home-made solution to the water crisis in Israel is largely a 
scientific one. Its major components are water desalinization, cloud 
seeding, and water reclamation. 
i. Water Desalinization 
The technology for desalting sea water has been available for many 
decades. It is implemented to various degrees in countries such as 
Mexico, Israel, and in many Arab states of the Persian Gulf. As for 
Israel, its introduction of desal inization plants to develop new water 
sources could be viewed as an application of the "access" philosophy 
that was particularly prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s. The existing 
levels of water consumption were accepted as given, and access to new 
resources were made a policy-- this time to the Red sea water. 
Israel began to experiment with the desalinization of sea water in 
1964; soon after the completion of the National Water Carrier and after 
the Arab states pronounced their intention to divert the head waters of 
the Jordan river away from Israel. Encouraged by the American 
Administration of President Lyndon Johnson, Israel built a nuclear 
powered desalinization plant to augment the country's water needs. 
This approach was quickly realized to be uneconomical and, as a result, 
Israel went on to build two non-nuclear desal inization plants in the 
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town of Eilat, at the southern tip of the Negev desert. These plants 
now supply most of the town's potable water needs. 
According to Kahhaleh (1981: 37), in 1973 Israel initiated a 15 
year desalinization project. It included three desalination plants all 
of which are to be connected with a nuclear reactor during the final 
stage of the scheme. In 1988, the total annual output of these plants 
is expected to be 155.4 MCM of fresh water. 
Writers such as Shuval (1980: 320) and Kahhaleh(1981: 37) agree 
that water desalinization is a prohibitively expensive proposition to 
be used for anything other than drinking. Both writers, however, 
disagree on the cost of desalinated water per cubic meter; the first 
estimates it at $1.00 to $2.50 and the second at $0.30. Shuval (1980: 
333) estimates the required capital investment needed to build 
desalinization plants capable of producing 100 MCM/year varies between 
$200 million and $300 million. 
The safety requirements in building nuclear plants increased the 
cost of nuclear energy and hence the cost of water desalination. 
Nuclear plants' safety became of great concern to people and 
governments especially after the disasters of Three Mile Island in 1979 
in Pennsylvania, and, more recently, the melt down of the Chernobyl 
Nuclear Reactor in the Ukraine in 1986. 
Another issue of particular concern to Israel is raised by Naff and 
Matson (1984: 12) and by Shuval (1980: 333). They assert that one fifth 
of Israel's electricity production is used to. pump water to its 
consumers, most of whom are farmers. In Israel, energy is consumed to 
pump water from aquifers, from lake Tiberias (210 meters below sea 
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level), for the country's irrigation system, and for its National Water 
Carrier. This is placing heavy pressure on the country's energy 
situation, especially since almost all of Israel's fuel needs are 
imported. As.a result of all the above factors, the earlier plans to 
build nuclear desalinization plants were put on hold in the late 1970s 
as the high cost per unit of water could no longer be justified. 
ii. Cloud Seeding ' 
Injecting silver iodide and frozen carbon dioxide into clouds to 
induce precipitation is a method that has been well studied and 
experimented with in Israel. One problem with this approach is that it 
is not a reliable means of increasing water supply; one needs cloud 
cover over a certain area in a certain time of the year which one can 
then seed. Another problem is that the location of precipitation from 
the seeded clouds is difficult to predict and control, especially in 
the relatively narrow state of Israel. For example, if clouds were 
seeded above lake Tiberias, precipitation may occur over Jordan or the 
Mediterranean, and not over Israel. A third problem with cloud seeding 
is that clouds are rarely formed where and when they are most needed; 
that is. in the arid Negev region during the irrigation season -- the 
dry summer. 
iii. Recycling/Reclaiming Waste Water 
Reclamation of effluents from agricultural settlements and the 
reuse of that water for irrigation began in the 1950s. Although the 
recycling of water was then accepted as part of the national water 
plan, it was given a very low priority. In the decade beginning in 
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1950, Israeli water planners emphasised the quantitative and 
distributional aspect of water resources and paid little attention to 
water quality. During this period new agricultural settlements were 
developing or expanding their irrigation systems. Despite this, 
farmers were not allocated enough water to meet their rising needs. 
This is largely the reason that led Israeli farmers to suggest the 
recycling of waste water. By the 1970s, water reclamation went beyond 
recycling effluents from small agricultural communities to include 
municipal discharges. By then, irrigation projects using reclaimed 
waste water had reached 150 in number, utilizing 37.5 MCM/yr of 
effluent. In 1980 "some 250 small and medium sized waste water 
irrigation projects were in operation and effectively recycled about 
20% of the urban waste water flow" (Shuval, 1980: 219). 
Water planners for the Israeli government intend to develop some 
300 MCM/yr of recycled water. This is to take place through the 
intensive utilization of 80% or more of the available waste water in 
all regions of the country. This target may theoretically be feasible 
to reach. Associated with such an ambitious plan is a complex web of 
environmental and social/marketing problems. The recycled water is 
usually not fit for drinking as it continues to have a number of 
contaminants. In essence, recycling treated sewage water is recycling 
contaminated water. Furthermore, the process of recycling often results 
in waste water percolating into aquifers thus polluting them (see 
Selbst, 1980 for a detailed study on the subject). Furthermore, 
treated and recycled sewage water is regarded by farmers as inferior to 
fresh water. The reasons for that are outlined by Selbst (1980: 250); 
74 
The source of water has an unpleasent association not only 
for those who work with it but also for potential customers 
so that it may affect the demand for certain produce. There 
are possible risks of long-term damage to soil and crop 
yields from known and unknown components of sewage. The 
commitment to effluent use for irrigation, once made, will be 
very difficult to reverse and given the disadvantages and 
risks involved it is not surprising that farmers feel that 
they have a claim on more than a cubic metre of effluent for 
every cubic metre of fresh water they agree to forego. 
Thus for reclaimed sewage water to become a conventional and routine 
part of water suppTy, exact and responsible agricultural planning on 
the part of the government is needed; and an attitudinal change to 
reflect open-mindedness on part of the consumers is essential. In 
spite of the problems associated with recycling waste water, this 
approach appears more economical and effective than the other two 
options discussed above. This is evident in the water planners' 
decision to seriously pursue effluent reclamation. 
4.3.2 The Foreign Prescription. 
The foreign options to Israel's water crisis are even more limited 
than the domestic ones. The foreign solution amounts to 
acquiring/importing water resources from a neighbouring country. Hence 
the following discussion focuses on the only two natural potential 
sources of water supply to Israel, namely the Nile river of Egypt and 
the Litani river of Lebanon. 
i. The Nile River, The Negev Desert, and Peace 
A permanent supply of a strategic resource like water is best 
acquired from a stable, friendly and reliable neighbour. Egypt is the 
only Arab country that has diplomatic relations with Israel. During 
the "Peace Process" between the two countries that eventually led to 
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the Camp David Accord, Anwar Sadat, the late President of Egypt, 
proposed channelling one percent of the Nile's water (ie. 800 MCM 
annually) into the Negev desert of Israel. That would have made the 
desert more inhabitable hence able to accommodate a larger population 
and a more diverse industrial base. 
Egypt's proposal may have been one of genuine symbolism of 
peace and goodwill to Israel. But after some reflection, one can see 
the political and economic dimensions of such a proposal, especially in 
an area riddled with hostility and mistrust. The influential Israeli 
daily, Ha'aretz (21 September, 1979), wrote that importing the Nile's 
water to the Negev settlements might make Israel "dangerously" 
dependent on Egypt. As a result, and in addition to water supplies 
from the Nile to Jewish settlements in the Negev desert, one suggestion 
was to s-upply the Palestinian residents of Gaza Strip with Egyption 
water as well. This would have presumably made Egypt reluctant to use 
its water "weapon" against Israel. 
Shortly after Sadat's approval of the "Peace Canal" project, local 
and foreign academics and politicians denounced Sadat's "gesture". 
They said that if the Nile's water was diverted, Egypt's development 
projects would be gravely affected, especially in the area of food 
production (Zohra, 1985). Furthermore, due to Egypt's population 
explosion and to its ambitious agricultural programs, the country is 
forecasted to have an annual water deficit of 20,000 to 60,000 MCM by 
the year 2000 (Zuheiri, 1985; Zohra, 1985). 
For Egypt, as for all other Middle Eastern states, food self 
sufficiency is a basic goal. Exporting part of a country's water 
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resources is bound to become a limiting factor to its agricultural 
expansion. The immediate effect of a food shortage and/or an increase 
in food prices are riots and demonstrations, as indicated by the events 
that almost toppled Sadat in the mid-1970s, and those that were partly 
responsible for the regime change in Sudan in 1985. Therefore, 
water-sharing schemes could lead to the political instability of both 
states, possibly to the economic decline of the supplying state. 
While one state could be in dire need for water, it can not risk 
becoming politically unstable, or economically dependent on the "good 
will" of a once archenemy. The "official" state of hostility between 
Israel and her neighbours (i.e. Syria, Lebanon and Jordan), and the 
shortage of water in the region, renders this resource non-tradable. 
Therefore, due to its explosive potentials politically and 
economicaJly, even passive cross-boundary acquisition of water is an 
unlikely venture. 
From the discussion above, it is clear that water in the Middle 
East and in other environmentally similar areas is considered a 
"national treasure" of strategic significance. River diversions have 
clear geopolitical and socio-economic ramifications with potential for 
regional destabi1ization. The "peaceful" acquisition of a strategic 
resource such as water, has wide regional implications, especially in 
an environment of hostility and mistrust as is the case in the Middle 
East. The "scientific" approach, vigorously explored by Israeli 
scientists, offers thus far no more than a banda.id solution to the 
incipient water crisis. 
The question, therefore, remains: what alternatives are there for a 
77 
developed and advantaged, but water-deficient state like Israel? Due 
to the nature of the water problem, namely that states are immovable 
territorial entities, and water being a prohibitively expensive 
resource to import by tankers, Israel's solution to the looming water 
water crisis can only be a regional one. Having ruled out water 
imports from the Nile, the Litani appears to have the remedy to 
Israel's water problem. 
4.4 The Litani River and Israel's Water Problems 
The Litani is Lebanon's longest river. It flows southwards through 
the country's fertile Bekaa Valley and then takes a sharp turn 
westwards passing through the narrow coastal strip to empty into the 
Mediterranean sea north of the city Sur (Tyre). The Litani river's 
flow and water sheds are inside Lebanese territory from its springs 
near Baalbeck to its mouth near Sur (Tyre) on the Mediterranean. 
Despite this, Rowley (1984: 145-146) asserts that, for Israel, the lure 
of the Litani is double pronged; namely the river's water quality and 
its quantity. Another luring factor is the inexpensive and the 
relative ease with which the Litani and the Hasbani rivers could be 
diverted to Israel (see Kubursi. 1982; Halawani, 1985) to supplement 
and/or replace her existing water sources. 
4.4.1 Water Quantity. 
The volume of the Litani's outflow is not only an issue of 
contention but one of contradiction and ambiguity amongst authors on 
this subject. The Litani river's annual flow could be as high as 900 
MCM; it is, however, estimated to average 700 MCM/yr. 
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Various development projects along the Litani utilize much of its 
water. Israel claims that over 50 % (or about 350 MCM/yr) of the 
Litani water flows into the sea unused; Lebanon's figure is 20 % (or 
about 100 MCM/yr) (Naff and Matson, 1984: 78). On the other hand, 
Thomas Stauffer (July, 1982: 13) contends that a 
Complete control of the (Litani) river would add at least 800 
million cubic metres per year to Israel's water supply, which 
could represent an increase of almost 50 percent of this 
critical resource. [Emphasis added] 
Stauffer (July, 1982: 11-13) wrote his article after Israel had 
occupied over one third of Lebanon, including most of the Litani 
river's flow area; i.e. up to a point few kilometers north of the 
Karoun Dam [Figure 4.1]. Stauffer's diversion figure of 800 MCM is 
some-what realistic only if Israel can arrange for the Litani to flow 
uninterrupted. This could be done if the Israeli army reoccupies the 
same region and opens the dam's gates, or if the Dam is destroyed by 
"accident", i.e. by Israel or by her agents. The second suggestion is 
a feasible one for two reasons. First, due to Lebanon's state of 
anarchy, arms, explosives, and mercenaries are ubiquitous. And these 
are the ingredients needed to transform this suggestion into reality. 
Second, Israel has previously attacked dams and other water works 
inside her neigbouring states including Syria, Jordan and certainly 
inside Lebanon (Naff and Matson, 1984: 78). Such a subversive action 
would have the desired effect of making the Litani flow uninterrupted 
to a diversion point somewhere along the western bend of the river 
(Naff and Matson. 1984: 78). 
If the Karoun dam remains operational and intact, Rowley (1984: 
79 
145) suggests that the Litani river's outflow is a mere 100 MCM/yr. It 
must be noted here that Rowley's figure is not referenced nor does it 
concur with Naff and Matson's analysis (1984: 77-78). When asked about 
the figure i.n his book, Dr. Gwyn Rowley wrote (letter dated 04 
February, 1987) to the author confirming the figure and stating that 
"The Litani data was obtained from Dr. Moshe Inbar of the University of 
Haifa" in Israel. 
Both Rowley (1984), and Naff and Matson (1984) overlooked a central 
point in Israel's hydro-strategy. Although the river's outflow may be 
100 MCM/yr, its flow amounts to 400 MCM/yr at the western bend near 
Khardali [Figure 4.1]; the ideal point for diverting the river 
southwards. This point is ideal because of the shere volume of water 
flow there, the proximity of the river bend to Israel (fewer than 10 km 
away from the border), and the relative elevation difference between 
the Khardali and the territory to its south east, a difference that 
will allow for the gravitational flow of water in the diversion canals. 
One of Rowley's (1984), and Naff and Matson's (1984) explanations for 
the Israeli occupation of the so called "security belt" is "the lure of 
the Litani". However, what both authors fail to discuss are the other 
hydrological resources of that belt, namely the water aquifers, the 
Hasbani and the Wazzani rivers of that region in south east Lebanon. 
Academics and reporters from Lebanon believe that Israel can divert 
far more than the estimated and normally accepted figure of 100 MCM of 
the Litai water per year. Additionally, 157 MCM/yr of the Hasbani 
river's water has been used by Israel since it foiled Lebanon's 
attempts to develop that resource after the 1967 War (Halawani, 1985: 
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54). Moreover, the former director-general of the Litani Water 
Authority (the government department in charge of executing the Litani 
Project), Salah Halawani (1985: 55), asserts that Israel could easily 
divert 400 MCM/yr of the Litani into her own water systems. Based on 
recent hydrological studies, Lebanon's most circulated newspaper, aj. 
Nahar (24 March, 1986), has recently confirmed Halawani's figures. In 
addition to that, water from the Wazzani river (a tributary to the 
Hasbani) has been piped southwards for use in Israel's northern region, 
the Galilee. This is according to a letter recently (4 April, 1987) 
received by the author from Dr. Rowley, a geographer from Sheffield 
University who is currently doing research on Israel's water needs. 
Baalbaki and Mahfouth (1985: 88-107) have analysed Israel's 
interests in the water resources of southern Lebanon, and detailed how 
Israel plans to divert these resources southwards. The authors point 
out that the flow of the Litani (between the Karoun dam and Khardali) 
is 400 MCM/yr, and that of the Wazzani is 67 MCM/yr [see Figure 4.1]. 
Baalbaki and Mahfouth (1985) are probably the first to discuss the 
ground water potential of south Lebanon in terms of Israel's hydraulic 
imperatives. Replenishable subterranean water in the foothills of 
Mount Hermon to the east are estimated by Baalbaki and Mahfouth (1985) 
to be 100 MCM/yr; and by aj Nahar (24 March, 1986) to be billions of 
cubic meters in volume. 
A foreseeable diversion scheme for which the infrastructure is 
already in place is that from the Litani near the village of Khardali, 
and from the Wazzani river (Baalbaki and Mahfouth, 1985: 88-107). From 
there, water from the Litani and the Wazzani rivers will be pumped to a 
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point 400 m above sea level to join Israel's National Water Carrier. 
This scheme will provide Israel with over 450 MCM of water per year. 
4.4.2 Water Quality 
Twenty five percent of Israel's water supply comes from lake 
Tiberias which is largely fed by the Jordan river. Despite the 
construction of the National Water Carrier, the Jordan river's water is 
not reaching the cultivable Negev desert in the envisaged quantities. 
The reasons for the latter are two fold: first, water from Lake 
Tiberias is required for the urbanized and industrialized central and 
coastal parts of Israel. The springs and coastal aquifers that once 
supplied the urbanized north and central parts of the country have been 
over utilized hence their water quality is deteriorating. Second, the 
Lake's salinity varies from 250 ppm at its northern end to 340 ppm at 
its southern end. This salinity level is too high for some sensitive 
and pervasive crops, like citrus fruit trees. 
Salinity of the Litani river averages about 20 ppm, hence Naff and 
Matson (1984: 65) write that "it is purity that makes the Litani very 
attractive to the Israelis, who have developed their National Water 
Carrier System with a view towards potable (as opposed to irrigation 
quality) water." This point is pursued further by Rowley (1984: 46) 
who notes that it is important to recognize that even 100 MCM/yr of the 
Litani's water "equals 25 percent of the flow with in the much heralded 
Israeli National Water Carrier." The diversion of the Litani would, 
therefore, benefit vast areas in Israel, far beyond the central and 
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western parts of the country. Once the pure water of the Litani 
reaches the National Water Carrier [see Figure 4.1] it would then be 
channelled as far south in Israel as the cultivable Negev desert, thus 
"making it bloom." 
4.5 Geopolitical Analysis of Water Scarcity 
Water transfer from Lebanon into Israel has many inter-related 
geopolitical .consequences that affect each country in a different way. 
In the following section, the geopolitical and socio-economic value of 
water to both Israel and Lebanon are analysed. 
4.5.1 The Value of Water to Israel 
Israel is currently tapping over 95 percent of its proven renewable 
water resources of 1600 MCM/yr. Today Israel is consuming over 1750 MCM 
annually, this includes desalinated and reclaimed water, as well as 
water from the West Bank and to a lesser degree from the Golan Heights 
(Banias tributary), and from south Lebanon (the Hasbani tributary). 
Galnoor (1980: 304-305) asserts that even 
the estimated additional water would not suffice to meet the 
growth in water demand expected up to 1990. The situation may 
be even worse if the precipitation is below average during 
this period and if the demand for higher quality water is 
accelerated. 
He then adds that in the absence of curtailed demand or of the 
technological breakthrough in producing "artificial water," which 
Galnoor (1980: 304-305) believes is unlikely in the near future, "even 
the most optimistic forecasts are gloomy about the prospects after 
1985." 
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The Israeli newspaper Haaretz, in an article entitled "The Dispute 
Over Water", as quoted by Davis (1979: 5), stated that 
the future increase in urban population and in standards of 
living will necessitate the development of some additional 
400 MCM of water toward 1990 [and 800 MCM by the year 2000, 
when Israel's water consumption will be 2,500 MCM annually 
(Naff and Matson, 1984: 53)]. If the needed quantity is not 
found, water have to be diverted from agriculture to domestic 
consumption. 
Against this background of rising water demands and limited 
supplies, coupled with an ideological supremacy in water policy, there 
is a consensus in Israel's water community that "some drastic steps 
will have to be taken in order to cope with water shortages" (Galnoor, 
1980: 304). The steps that Galnoor suggests involve a 15-20% reduction 
in the total agricultural water consumption by the year 2000. One 
problem with this suggestion is that it is unpopular and therefore 
politically risky. The "spiritual" value of agriculture is deeply 
entrenched in the Israeli society, and it transcends all political 
affiliations and orientations. Another problem is that even a 20 % 
reduction in agricultural water consumption will at best amount to 150 
MCM by the year 2000 --currently, agricultural water consumption is 
close to 1300 MCM. 
Reliance on waste water reclamation will add about 400 MCM by the 
year 1990 (Galnoor, 1980: 300). Here two issues must be remembered: 
first, heavy reliance on water reclamation is a process that utilizes 
energy and requires capital outlays, thus higher water costs. Second, 
initial studies on the environmental and health impacts resulting from 
treated and reused water have revealed unfavorable results (see Shuval, 
1980: 211-242 for a full discussion). In spite of all this, and even 
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if by the year 2000, Israel was able to augment her water supply by 
500-600 MCM/yr, that would still not meet her forecasted water deficit 
of 800 MCM/yr. This would keep Israel hostage to its water needs, 
especially in drought years or in times of population expansion. 
Furthermore, a shortage of water could have grave economic 
consequences on the Israeli economy. In a study of the shadow prices 
of key economic indicators in the Israeli economy, Kubursi (1982: 99) 
concluded that water has the highest shadow price. So if there is a 
drop in water supplies, the shadow price of the resource will 
skyrocket, and its added value will rapidly decline thus negatively 
impacting the Israeli economy. 
Israel is clearly in need of new water resources merely to maintain 
the current rate of water consumption. It is estimated that if 150 
MCM/yr of the Litani water is diverted southwards, Israel could then 
irrigate 25,000 more hectares which in turn, according to the Arabic 
weekly magazine al-Tadamun (April 1984: 68), would permit Israel to 
increase its population by 25 percent, or one million immigrants. For 
Israel, such a population boost could "translate into an increase of 25 
percent of its mobilization force, which is an increase of about 1.4 
mi 11 ion draftees." 
Baalbaki and Mahfouth (1985) believe that Israel could divert 450 
MCM of water annually from both the Litani and the Wazzani rivers. The 
authors assert that 350 MCM of water will allow Israel to expand her 
irrigated land by 70,000 hectares, and the remaining 100 MCM to meet 
the domestic/potable needs of 1.25 million Jewish immigrants. 
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Moreover, additional water sources would certainly be needed if tens of 
thousands of Russian Jews are to emigrate to Israel and be absorbed in 
that society. The early waves of immigrants have had a similar effect 
on the rate of water consumption in the country. 
For Israel to remain or indeed regain its attractiveness to the 
international Jewish body and to its own citizens, the standard of 
living and development in the country must be increased sharply. This 
would be difficult to achieve if the country was to try and 
conserve/ration water or reallocate it away from agriculture. The high 
rate of water consumption, the subsidy of the resource, and the water 
intensive aesthetic and recreation facilities will therefore have to 
continue. 
If the current pattern of water consumption continues, Naff and 
Matson (1984: 12) contend that Israel will have depleted all of its 
renewable sources of fresh water "by the mid 1990s, which adds critical 
complicating factors to the issue of its [Israel's] occupation of the 
West Bank, the Golan Heights, and southern Lebanon." Instead of 
suffering the economic set backs associated with severe water 
shortages, Israel will finally divert the Litani into the Jordan river 
system [see Figure 4.1]. 
A number of Israeli politicians believe that south Lebanon must 
remain in Israel's "sphere of influence", because they believe that 
only the Litani offers a solution to their country's water crisis (Naff 
and Matson, 1984). This would partially explain why two Israeli 
governments under two different leaderships (Shamir for the Likud 
party, and Perez for Labour) have been unwilling to pull out of Lebanon 
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completely. This is also underlined by the fact that both party leaders 
have headed two minority coalition governments. Furthermore, Naff and 
Matson (1984: 79) note that Arab countries' promises "to finance 
irrigation reconstruction and development schemes in southern Lebanon 
(for use by indigenous Lebanese) in the event of an Israeli withdrawl 
may well impede Israeli willingness to withdrawl." 
4.5.2 The Value of Water to Lebanon 
Since independence in 1943, Lebanon's successive governments have 
always given hydro-electrical power generation a priority over any 
other water related projects. For this purpose, Lebanon planned to 
build a series of dams, mostly along the Litani river. Pressure from 
the local farmers and from the World Bank convinced the government to 
incorporate irrigation into the hydro-electric generation plan. 
Initially, the government avoided the irrigation issue in order to 
avoid any possible sectarian outcries accusing it of setting up an 
irrigation scheme favoring one sect over another. Some years later, the 
government finally approved the "Litani Project", which incorporated 
irrigation schemes with hydroelectrical power generation plans. A 
government agency known as the "Litani Authority" was founded to manage 
the Project. 
i. The Litani Project 
By the mid-1970s, the area of irrigated land in Lebanon had 
increased sharply but it was still far below the country's potential. 
This was essentially due to the slow implementation of the irrigation 
schemes undertaken by the government. The Litani project has been 
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described by Sayigh (1978) and Fisher (1985) as a crowning example of 
slowness, indecision and wastefulness. 
"The Litani Project, as (first) realized, was exclusively for 
hydroelectricity. Recently, pressure has been applied to use some of 
the water for irrigation" (Hudson, 1971: 9). This pressure was being 
applied internally, by local farmers, and externally by various Arab 
governments who wanted to mitigate any foreign threat to Lebanon's 
water. The urgency was partly sparked by Israeli charges that the 
Litani's water was "flowing uselessly" into the sea and their expressed 
interest in sharing that resource (Gilmour,1984; Naff and Matson, 
1984). 
After much debate, the Lebanese government, with the aid of $24m 
loan from the World Bank, approved the Litani Project which included 
irrigation and hydroelectric generation plants. Despite its financial 
backing, the project suffered from many setbacks due to (1) 
insufficient background data on the river's flow; (2) inefficiency or 
non-existence of aerial surveys, soil analysis, and research on farmers 
attitudes and the like; (3) false starts; (4) change in priorities; (5) 
defective work performance (resulting in the collapse of tunnels and 
other serious and costly results); and (6) disagreements (among the 
large landlords, and political pressure groups allied with them) as to 
the course of irrigation canals and the altitude which irrigation water 
is to reach. (Sayigh, 1978; Hudson, 1971). 
The first phase of the Litani plan was completed.in 1965. The Litani 
Authority built a dam on the southern part of the river in the Bekaa 
valley. The dam created an artificial lake capable of holding 225 MCM 
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of water. Both the lake and the dam were named after the bordering town 
of Karoun. 
ii. Irrigation And its Problems 
The other aspect of the Litani project was irrigation. The complete 
irrigation plan was expected to provide water for 26,000 hectares in 
three different areas: "part of the southern Biqa' (Bekaa), scattered 
patches of ^ood land in the Galilean Uplands, and parts of the 
Sidon-Beirut coastal area" (Hudson, 1971: 8). The last two areas were 
later dropped from the plan only to expand the southern Bekaa 
irrigation scheme. 
The irrigation part of the Plan was implemented slower than the 
hydro-electric one. Currently, the overwhelming problem facing the 
irrigation plan is financial (obviously, the on-going civil war is an 
overriding impediment to any development project). The World Bank has 
agreed in principle to provide $50 million of credits, and Abu Dhabi 
has promised to advance or grant LL 150 million for the project. 
Despite this assistance, budgetary constraints due to war damages have 
hampered the quick allocation of funds and caused a slow-paced 
execution of the project. By 1975 both the coastal and Bekaa irrigation 
schemes were to be completed. However, only the basic irrigation works 
for the Bekaa scheme were completed and became operational. The 
maintenance of this basic irrigation system (canals, pipes, pumps ...) 
is currently affected by the instability in the country which often 
renders the system un-operational. 
The first two stages of the Litani development Plan has been 
implemented. They included the development of an irrigation system in 
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the central Bekaa, building the Karoun dam and hydroelectric power 
generating plants. The third and last stage of this Plan was intended 
to irrigate thousands of hectares of agricultural land in southern 
Lebanon, and. to generate enough hydroelectricity to satisfy the 
domestic needs of that region. This necessitated the construction of a 
dam and a reservoir at the Khardali, just north of the western bend of 
the Litani. According to Naff and Matson (1984: 74), "the Lebanese 
government has been unable to implement this stage due to the loss of 
sovereignty over the south to the Israelis and the PLO." Furthermore 
and according to Lebanese sources, "U.S. government financial 
institutions", influenced by the Israeli lobby, blocked Lebanon's bid 
to acquire a loan from the World Bank for its development schemes 
(Stauffer, 20 January, 1982). 
iii. Water As a Factor of Stability. 
Now that the PLO is out of south Lebanon, the only real remaining 
obstacle to development is the rebirth of an effective central 
government in Beirut, able to reestablish the sovereignty of the 
country. The re-emergence of an effective and uniting Lebanese 
government is partly dependent on its willingness to address the plight 
and grievances of the country's largest minority group, the Shiite 
Muslims. They are estimated to number over 850,000, and seem to live 
in higher concentrations in southern Lebanon than any where else in the 
country. Most of the Shiite, especially those in south Lebanon, are 
poor farmers that have always been largely neglected by the government 
in Beirut. 
The lack of government programs to help develop south Lebanon led 
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essential steps; in their absence, the South can not be economically 
developed, thus Lebanon will neither regain its political stability nor 
its unity. Therefore, selling or diverting the Litani's water into 
Israel away .from the Shiite farmers who do not receive enough for 
irrigation would foment resentment against the Christian-dominated 
government of Lebanon (Naff and Matson, 1984). 
TABLE 4.5 
Irrigated and Irrigable 
Area Requirements 
7,000 
-
33,000 
48,000 
27,000 
9,000 
51,000 
55,000 
Irrigated Irrigable Total 
District Area (ha) Area (ha) (ha) 
N. Lebanon 20,000 
Mount Lebanon 9,000 
Bekaa 18,000 
Southern Lebanon 7,000 
TOTAL 54,000 88,000 142,000 
Source: Fawaz, 1967: 297. These are also the 
most recent provincial figures. 
TABLE 4.6 
Lebanon: Available Water Supply 
and Projected Demand [*] 
District 
N. Lebanon 
Mount Lebanon 
Beirut 
Beqaa 
South Lebanon 
TOTAL 
Water 
supply 
in 1967 
110,000 
160,000 
125,000 
52,000 
103,000 
550,000 
Water 
demand 
in 1985 
107,000 
118,000 
132,000 
62,000 
73,000 , 
492,000 
Water 
demand 
in 2005 
144.000 
158,000 
177,000 
83,000 
98,000 
660.000 
Source: Van der Leeden, 1975: 240. 
* All figures are in cubic meters per day. 
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iv. Current and Future Water Needs. 
In 1984, Lebanon's water consumption was estimated to be 870 
MCM/yr [Table 4.3], which is less than the supplied volume in an arid 
year. On the other hand, Al-Hawadith weekly news magazine estimated 
that 
Lebanon's population in the year 2000 will be about five 
million persons, (compared to three millions in 1984). The 
irrigated area' will have to be enlarged to 200,000 hectares 
(compared to 60,000 ha in 1984), ... the water requirements 
in the year 2000 will be close to the supply of an ordinary 
year which is 2,250 MCM (al-Hawadith. May 11, 1984: 52). 
Therefore, by the year 2000 Lebanon will barely meet its water needs. 
Other forecasts are gloomier. According to Naff and Matson (1984, 
p.80), the World Bank reports that although Lebanon "has a relative 
abundance of water resources", it may "face critical shortages in the 
near future for both domestic and agricultural usage." 
4.6 Summary 
Israel's pattern of high water consumption is established and 
reinforced by the country's ideology, Zionism. The country is 
utilizing all of its available and replenishable water resources. Since 
demand for water is out-stripping supplies, Israel has been 
supplementing her water resources from effluent reclamation and to a 
lesser extent from desal imzat ion. This high rate of water consumption 
has led to the over-pumping of the country's coastal aquifers as a 
result of which sea water has been seeping into them. Domestic 
attempts to augment Israel's water supplies have been partly successful 
but offer no real solution to the deepening water crisis in the 
country. The only feasible option left for Israel is to divert south 
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Lebanon's water resources into the National Water Carrier. 
Diverting the Litani into Israel will likely solve that country's 
water problems but create deeper political problems for Lebanon. A 
diversion can.only be made possible by either overt Israeli occupation 
of south Lebanon, or by a covert occupation by proxy through the 
Israeli created and supported "South Lebanese Army." So a diversion 
will not only kill any irrigation or development plans intended for 
south Lebanon, it will keep that country destabilized and in turmoil. 
A diversion of the Litani will certainly fan the fires of hatred, 
mistrust, and renewed conflict; it will also re-enforce Arab suspicions 
of the expansionist nature of Israel. Diverting Lebanon's water will 
have destabilizing political ramifications in the whole region which 
could quite easily develop into a another Syrian-Israeli war. Moreover, 
the chances of finding a peaceful solution to the wider Arab-Israeli 
conflict will become slimmer or vanish completely if such a diversion 
takes place. 
These facts have politicized and internationalized the Litani river 
"dispute". This case study of water conflict will next be tested 
within the framework of conflict theory as discussed in Chapter 2 of 
this thesis. 
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C H A P T E R F I V E 
Analysis of Conflict Theory 
And 
Water Scarcity 
The conflict over water between Lebanon and Israel is almost a 
century old. This conflict is being remanifested due to the rising 
water demands and the depletion of the resource in Israel and also in 
Lebanon. This chapter sets out to test the nature and development of 
water scarcity in the Middle East within the already discussed theory 
of conflict. It was determined in Chapter Four that Israel's looming 
water crisis due to her need for greater resources is but a 
complementary explanation to the state of hostilities between Israel 
and Lebanon. So the motif in this chapter is to determine whether or 
not this "scarcity induced conflict" follows the model depicting the 
process and phase of conflict presented in Chapter Two (Figures 2.1 and 
2.2). 
Scarcity of water in the Middle East is rarely viewed as a 
contributing factor to Arab-Israeli hostilities, most recently between 
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Lebanon and Israel. The approach taken in this chapter is one of 
analysis, correlation and integration of events (social, economic, and 
geopolitical) between the two Middle Eastern antagonists and conflict 
theory. Each phase of the model of conflict process is tested with the 
corresponding events in the case study. A modification of the model in 
Chapter Two is offered as a refinement that better describes the reason 
for and path of conflict process in the present context. The changes 
involve, in particular, the word "trigger", the introduction of the 
"time" factor to the conflict process, and the additional role assumed 
by the structure of expectations as an influencing factor in the 
balancing of power phase. The revised model, depicted in Figures 5.1 
and 5.2, is discussed in the latter part of this chapter. 
5.1 A Latent Water Conflict 
The essence of water conflict between Israel and Lebanon is one of 
state "competition" for this limited resource, hence the 
incompatibility of their interests. The natural environment and the 
evolution of the geopolitical setting embody within it the seeds of a 
latent conflict. This may be called the latent conflict phase. 
As a result of the geopolitical setting, there had always been an 
inherent but latent water conflict in historic Palestine. There, the 
indigenous population was sparsely scattered across the land and 
comprised prosperous traders and subsistence farmers. Hence the latent 
water conflict was onsetting on the area in a very slow fashion. 
As discussed in Chapter Four, Zionism is an ideology that was 
formulated in a European setting for implementation in an Asian 
setting, an area referred to by the Jews as the "Promised Land." One 
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basic premise of Zionism was to create a Jewish State in this "Promised 
Land" to which millions of Jews in diaspora will immigrate. Another 
important pillar of Zionism is its emphasis on agriculture in, as it 
turned out to be, a largely arid and water-deficient land. Naturally 
this was a disrupting challenge to the existing ethno-political status 
quo in the region, and to the existing passive relation with the 
natural environment. The aridity of the natural environment in 
Palestine made Zionist leaders instantly aware of water scarcity in the 
country. So as early as 1918, the Zionists of Europe were demanding 
that the Litani river be included within the boundaries of Palestine, 
promised to them by Britain. They must have realized that --in 
addition to the availability and use of technology, and the presence of 
socio-political organizations to manage and direct technological 
applications— 
The numbers of people any given piece of territory can 
support —and their standard of living-- may be expected to 
depend also upon their ability to supplement domestic 
resources with materials from the outside (North, 1977: 583). 
As a source of potential conflict, latent awareness of resource 
scarcity was. for decades, only felt by one side, the Zionists. This 
was due to Zionist-funded hydrological studies of the area, and to the 
centrality of agriculture and hence water to Zionism. The Arabs of 
Palestine were not as aware or even concerned about the water 
limitations of their country. This was due to the fact that their 
traditional farming and trading life styles were . not yet affected or 
actively challenged by the Zionists: nor did the Arabs anticipate a 
rapid population expansion. Moreover, due to the pro-Zionist British 
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Mandate over Palestine, and the great political organization and 
influence of the Zionists, the native Arabs had little control over 
their destiny. Therefore, the geo-political setting of Lebanon and 
Israel, and -the challenges of an alien ideology created biases, 
opposing values and attitudes. These factors, as well as the latent 
awareness of the problem of water scarcity correspond well with the 
first phase in the model of conflict process. 
So at this stage of the water conflict, latent awareness was a 
direct and an immediate consequence of Zionism. So while awareness was 
an early factor in the conflict process, it did not initiate active 
opposition to the pattern of water distribution and/or utilization; 
that is, it did not initiate conflict. 
5.2 Conflict Initiation and Active Awareness 
This early Zionist awareness of resource scarcity remained 
passively latent until the 1950s and the Jordan river dispute. These 
tensions over the Jordan water were a contributing cause to the 1967 
Arab-Israeli War. So the Jordan river dispute and its culmination in 
violent conflict constitute the first and the only complete cycle in 
the process of conflict over water. The outcome of this conflict cycle 
was not just a territorial victory but a resource victory for Israel as 
she increased her water supply by over 400 MCM/yr, or 40% of her total 
water needs. 
A 1964 Arab Summit adopted a resolution that required Israel's 
neighbours to develop and divert (away from Israel) the waters of the 
Jordan river's tributaries at their source. This strategy was meant to 
greatly reduce the water flow into lake Tiberias, Israel's largest 
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fresh water reservoir. Soon after its attempt to divert the Hasbani 
waters toward the Yarmouk river of Jordan, Lebanon became boldly aware 
of the incompatibility of her water interests with those of Israel. 
Thereupon, the latter country struck at the water diversion and 
development sites not only inside Lebanon, but also inside Jordan and 
Syria. For Lebanon this could be viewed as the point when the latent 
water conflict entered the phase of conflict initiation. For Israel, 
this was intended to underscore the value it attaches to water. This 
aggressive move by Israel transformed its once latent and opposing 
attitude into active and opposing interest. 
During this phase (1964-1982) of conflict initiation, Israeli 
leaders began to once again express interest in sharing or buying water 
resources from Lebanon. In the wake of the June War of 1967 and of 
Israel's" territorial gains from three of its four neighbours, Moshe 
Dayan, the Defence Minister of that country, stated that (as quoted by 
Hof, 1985: 36) Israel had achieved "provisionally satisfying frontiers, 
with the exception of those with Lebanon." Israel later charged that 
the Litani's water was flowing wastefully into the Mediterranean (Naff 
and Matson, 1984). 
Being a disadvantaged state economically and militarily, Lebanon 
became active in developing the resource potentials of the Litani. In 
part, this was intended to silence Israel's charges and disperse her 
interest in, and claims to the river; a typical internal (versus 
international) policy response and passive behaviour on the part of the 
weaker power when challenged by a stronger one. Therefore, what we 
have here may be called an active awareness (as opposed to latent 
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awareness) of water scarcity reflected in Lebanon's use and Israel's 
needs. The incompatibility of these two outcomes were manifested in 
the opposing interests of both countries, Lebanon and Israel. 
5.3 The Balancing and Balance of Power 
And Israel's Response to the Water Crisis 
In the phase of balancing of power, the path or policy chosen by a 
state (be it coercive, non-coercive, or accommodation) directly affects 
and influences each component (i.e. interest, capability, and 
credibility) in the balance of power phase. Hence the policies or 
decisions considered in the balancing phase have to be carefully 
measured so to ensure their highest potential of yielding the desired 
balance of power; otherwise, they could be detrimental to the 
initiating state. Therefore, due to this inter-connectedness of both 
phases, they will be tested together in the same section. 
Due to its growing water demands, the prohibitively expensive 
technical solution to the water problem, and the failure of the 
Nile-to-Negev canal proposal, Israel has had to develop (and in some 
cases, over-develop) all of its replenishable water resources, 
including those acquired in 1967. The gap between water supply and 
demand in Israel has gradually been widening, thus pushing the country 
towards a hydraulic uncertainty. By its 1978 invasion of Lebanon, 
Israel seems to have moved into the balancing of power phase in the 
country's recurring conflict for water. However, due to (1) the 
absence of an official Israeli request to import water from Lebanon, 
and (2) the lack of overt or significant coercive efforts to divert 
water from the "security zone", the water conflict starts to diverge 
from the process of conflict model suggested in Figure 2.1. 
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There were apparently no pressing or sudden hydrological reasons to 
"trigger" Israel's large scale invasions of Lebanon in 1978 as well as 
in 1982. By and large, the only geopolitical evidence of these 
invasions is the "security zone"; in other words, and not withstanding 
the battles that ensued during the invasion period, this zone has 
mostly been free from security or water-induced conflicts. So after 
all the dust from both invasions settled, Israel still has 1000 of its 
soldiers (who are regularly attacked) as "advisors" to the SLA, an 
"army" of local Lebanese trained, armed, and financed by Israel. 
Having established that the declared objectives of Israel in 1978 
and in 1982 have not been met, why is it still willing to suffer the 
human and economic costs of maintaining the "security zone"? Is there 
a hydraulic dimension to this zone? 
5.4 A "Security" Belt or a Hydraulic One? 
Although Israel has not yet suffered from any severe water 
shortages, it is expected to become water-deficient in about 20 years. 
So Israel's early (1976) involvement in, and its (1978) creation of a 
"security belt" in southern Lebanon could be explained within the 
context of two plausible scenarios: one is related to security and the 
other to long-term hydro-strategies. 
5.4.1 The Security-related Scenario. 
The 1978 and 1982 invasions were both triggered by Palestinian 
commandos' raids on Israeli citizens and diplomats. Indeed, these 
invasions were too extensive to be considered as merely retaliatory; 
they constituted a bold test of the status quo between Israel and 
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Lebanon. What was the desired outcome of this test? In both 
invasions, the official objective of Israel was to protect its citizens 
not only at home but also abroad from the menace of terrorism eminating 
from Lebanon. Israel sought to pursue this objective by making 
southern Lebanon "terrorist free", and by establishing a narrow 
"terrorist free" area which became to be known as the "security zone." 
The immediate (but short-lived) outcome of of both invasions was 
the expulsion of Palestinian guerrillas ("terrorists") from southern 
Lebanon. Moreover, in spite of its occupation-by-proxy of the "security 
zone", Israel claims to have no territorial ambitions in Lebanon. This 
is proven by (1) the "voluntary" withdrawl of Israel's troops from the 
large areas they occupied in 1978 and in 1982; and (2) by transferring 
the command of the "security zone" over to a local militia known as the 
"South Lebanese Army" or SLA [Figure 5.3]. 
In spite of the "security belt", and of the two (1978 and 1982) 
severe blows to Palestinian commandos in southern Lebanon, Israel 
continues to be attacked —perhaps on a smaller scale, and it continues 
to retaliate. It is important to note that many of these attacks 
(which often use rockets) originate from outside the "security zone", 
and they are increasingly carried out by Lebanese citizens. Thus 
Israel's eviction of the Palestinian commandos from Southern Lebanon 
(who have been returning in large numbers, and re-arming), and her 
creation of this "security belt" have both failed to yield peace and 
security, the sole declared objective of Israel. 
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5.4.2 The Water-related Scenarios 
The hydro-strategic significance of southern Lebanon is rarely 
considered as an explanatory factor to Israel's continued 
occupation-by-proxy of territory in south Lebanon. It was deduced in 
Chapter Four that the only feasible solution (in terms of water 
quality, volume and the proximity of the resource) to Israel's growing 
water problem is an external one, namely from southern Lebanon. The 
outbreak of civil war in Lebanon in 1975 was an opportune time for 
Israel to strengthen her long-term political posture with Lebanon. 
Thus the creation of the "security zone" in 1978 has made Israel 
strategically positioned to have greater access to resources. 
Against this background, three water-related sub-scenarios are 
presented. First, Israel would have been in a weak if not impossible 
position -to negotiate a water sharing agreement with the central 
government in Lebanon --had the latter country's civil war ended as it 
then appeared like it might. 
Second, since the Litani river is of utmost importance to the 
development and stability of Lebanon, the country is unlikely to share 
or bargain away the river's water. Having realized that, the "security 
belt" put Israel in a position from which it can either extort a water 
sharing agreement, or unilaterally, and indeed illegally divert the 
Litani waters southwards [Figure 5.3]. Both options, especially the 
latter one, would have minimal regional and international 
repercussions, say 20 years or so after Israel's occupation of the 
"security belt." At that time, this belt may take on a biblical name 
(the West Bank is now referred to by its Judaic names, Judaia and 
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Figure 5.3 
Security Belt of South Lebanon 
• Israel Defence Force 
o Israel Defence Force and/or SLA 
• South Lebanon Army 
•
Sources: The Economist, Sept. 27, 1986 
Security Zone 
UN Security Council, Apri l 1 1 , 1985: S /17093 
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Samaria) or become known as the occupied "North Bank". Similar to the 
episode of the West Bank, a period of stable and well managed 
occupation/hegemony of the "security belt" is needed before Israel 
could begin her exploitation of south Lebanon's water resources. 
Third, shortly after the creation of the "security belt", many 
ground water wells were shut down. They were said to have affected the 
water flow in the Hasbani river and in its tributaries. Furthermore, 
the belt is a means of preventing Lebanon from utilizing its share of 
these rivers, and from fully developing the waters of the Litani. 
In short, Israel'e innovative foreign policy approach leaves her 
the option of accommodation through the bargaining process (with the 
possibility of manipulating —ie.black mailing— Lebanon with the 
"security belt"), or the coercive route to acquire south Lebanon's 
resources. These are long term policy options that may be activated 
when a water crisis eventually befalls the state of Israel. 
Summary 
Israel has never clearly declared that access to more water 
resources is one of its objectives in any of the Arab-Israeli Wars, in 
particular that of 1967, and the more recent invasions of Lebanon in 
1978 and in 1982. In spite of this, the outcome of these wars has 
always translated into greater water resources for Israel (Naff and 
Matson, 1984). Therefore, it appears that in these three wars there 
had been a "hidden agenda" that reflects Israel's expanding water needs 
and interests. This becomes a complicating or a blurring factor to a 
real and comprehensive understanding of the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
hence making its resolution exceedingly difficult. The foreign policy 
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objective of Israel toward Lebanon is always defined in the context of 
security and "Peace For Galilee", Israel's northern region. Despite 
the scale, carnage, and destruction caused in pursuit of this 
objective, it has largely failed. That not withstanding, the "security 
belt" of 1978 has been bolstered. Why? What stage of the conflict 
process is the Lebanese-Israeli water conflict at now? 
The "security belt" could be viewed as a staging platform toward a 
long-standing hydraulic objective. The water conflict is now at a 
position of status QUO testing, reflection, and planning, after which 
it will choose a coercive, non-coercive, or an accommodating policy 
approach. The water conflict is currently stagnating and diverging from 
the process of conflict model (Fig. 2.1). This will be the motif of 
the discussion in the following pages. 
*** *** *** 
5.5 A Revised Model of Conflict Process 
There appears to be a number of inconsistencies between the 
theoretical model of conflict process as derived and defined in Chapter 
Two (Figures 2.1 and 2.2), and the case study as discussed and 
developed in Chapters Three and Four. In particular, four aspects of 
the water conflict between Lebanon and Israel are introduced. The 
proposed changes, which largely affect the model starting at the 
balancing of power phase (ie. third phase), are (1) the broadening 
influence of the structure of expectations, (2) the by-proxy 
intervention of states in a certain country to secure access to 
strategic resources, (3) the introduction of the time factor, and (4) 
the deletion of "triggers/disrupters" from the model of "natural" 
106 
scarcity-induced conflict over resources. Therefore, the earlier model 
of conflict process, as depicted in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, is revised to 
reflect more accurately the conflict process during a 
naturally-occurring resource scarcity. So this section sets to discuss 
these changes and introduces these revisions in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. 
5.5.1 The Factor of Time in The Conflict Process 
Resource, scarcity does not befall a nation instantly nor does it 
always lead to violent conflict. Both of these propositions have one 
common denominator, time. The real or perceived duration of a scarcity 
affects the structure of expectations in a state thus affecting its 
behavior. Even in some extreme cases of resource scarcity, such as the 
1973 oil crisis, the boycotted states responded to the same (and would 
to a similar) event in relatively predictable ways. So if the 1973 oil 
crisis was perceived to be long-lasting, the affected countries, led by 
the most advantaged and perhaps oil dependent, would have coercively 
secured access to the oil fields of the Middle East. In this case 
study, some regional instability and a limited degree of international 
disorder would have been, for the industrialized world, a price worth 
paying to maintain their advantaged status. In cases of sudden 
scarcity of strategic resources, which is usually a result of a boycott 
or a blockade, coercion is often used to allow for the free flow of 
resources. Similarly, perceiving and fearing water shortages, Israel 
responded militarily to her neighbour's plan in 1964 to divert the head 
waters of the Jordan river. 
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Fortunately, oil shortages were perceived as temporary. Hence the 
relatively brief socio-economic inconveniences and sacrifices 
outweighed the coercive (military) option with all the uncertainties 
associated with it. Therefore, the onset of a scarcity affects the 
timing and the type of response to be taken. 
After her substantial resource gains in 1967 from the West Bank and 
the Golan Heights, ^ srael had no hydrological reasons nor a political 
excuse to then covet south Lebanon's water resources. Therefore, the 
factor of time may completely defuse a potential conflict (ie. if 
Israel's earlier resource gams had met her long term needs) or delay 
it as was the case with the Lebanese-Israeli water conflict. 
Thus the relative time in which a scarcity descends on a country or 
a region is an important factor in the conflict process; a factor 
neglected by Rummel (1976: 265-288), and not specifically accounted for 
in Figure 2.1. 
5.5.2 A Triggered Conflict or An Onsetting One? 
Using the word "trigger" in the conflict model (Figure 2.1) refers 
to a sudden occurrence that disrupts the structure of expectations, the 
status quo, and the natural trends in international relations. 
However, the word "trigger" is somewhat misleading to use in the 
context of a naturally occurring scarcity such as that with water in 
the Middle East. 
The oil boycott of 1973 created an artificial and a perceived 
scarcity. On the other hand, while largely human-induced, water 
depletion in the Middle East takes place within the natural process. 
This causes a "real", gradually onsetting, and in some regions an 
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irreversible water scarcity. Thus "triggers/disrupters" are 
inapplicable to the revised model (Figure 5.1). 
In the context of this case study, the reason (or "trigger") for 
Israel's creation of the "security belt" could be explained as one step 
in Israel's long term planning to gradually acquire greater water 
resources. Israel's early and close monitoring of the changing 
structure of expectations in, and water needs of the country are 
reflected in her resource-induced policies. They are "pre-emptive" 
albeit disguised policies to secure access to new water sources for the 
"drier" years ahead. 
5.5.3 Status-quo Testing and The Structure of Expectations. 
The resource demands of a given population and the structure of 
expectations in it are constantly changing, both in terms of quality 
and quantity. Severe resource shortages have the potential of 
adversely affecting the overall capability of a state. Hence such 
scarcities are less likely to be tolerated by an advantaged state than 
by a disadvantaged one. So a state (especially a rapidly developing 
one) that has a relatively small territorial base and/or scarce 
resources often relies on resource imports to satisfy its needs. In 
the case of water in the Middle East, it is by and large regarded as a 
scarce and a non-tradable commodity. 
Since naturalIv occurring resource scarcities gradually befall 
states, they have ample time to carefully plan and develop a long term 
coping or impact-mitigation strategy. This has been Israel's approach 
to its onsetting water shortages. 
The establishment of a "security belt" and the SLA [Figure 5.3] are 
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but implementations of proposals that were first spelled out by Israeli 
officials in the 1950s. The territory that was proposed to come under 
Israeli control is the whole area south of the Litani river. The mere 
choice of the Litani as a demarcation line reflects the implicit 
hydraulic dimension of Israel's interest in Lebanon. The recent 
execution of Israel's early plan supports the view of Israel's long 
term planning strategies. 
Israel's decision to enter the balancing of power phase in 1978, 
and its continuous construction of a self-serving status-quo in the 
"security belt", represent another early but warranted concern about 
the dwindling water potential of that country. It is, therefore, clear 
that the stage for Israel's hydro-strategy is being carefully laid out 
so it is most responsive to the changing structure of expectations in 
the country. With the current arrangement, Israel's water interests 
could be easily achieved. 
Being in control of the water-rich area of south Lebanon, Israel is 
currently at the stage of planning how best to ameliorate her onsetting 
water crisis. One strategy that is apparently underway involves the 
transformation of the current, largely hostile, status-quo environment 
in southern Lebanon into one that is more self-serving. This Israeli 
approach can be explained in two ways. First, due to the slow change 
in the structure of expectations, the onset of the water crisis has 
been gradual. Israel, then, is not in immediate need of south 
Lebanon's water. So what is noticeable here -is that the dynamic 
structure of expectations is affecting Israel's policy-making posture 
as it plans its path through the balancing of power or interest phase ( 
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Figure 5.2 
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see Figure 2.2). This is an alteration to the previously discussed 
model of conflict process in Chapter Two, Figures 2.1 and 2.2). 
Second, currently, the costs of taking an openly aggressive approach to 
the water problem (such as international condemnation, regional 
instability, and local armed opposition that might sabotage water 
diversion schemes) outweigh the benefits, namely water. 
Israel's new approach to the balancing of power phase was initiated 
in 1978 when it created the "security zone". In essence, this amounts 
to an "occupation by proxy"; an approach deemed more acceptable and 
tolerable by both the occupied, the occupier, and by the international 
body. On the other hand, the "security belt" and the SLA are the ideal 
means for the creation of a self-serving social and political 
environment; one that fulfills Israel's water needs through 
accommodation. 
There is a huge capability gap between Lebanon and Israel. Thus 
when Israel, an advantaged country in the region, enters the balancing 
of power phase, it will have the option of the coercive, non-coercive, 
or the accommodation route. The last option seems to be the current 
Israeli approach in the "security belt". The choice of this route is 
part of the new colonizing or occupation approach which is both 
flexible and self-serving. 
If the occupation by proxy of southern Lebanon fails, then Israel 
would have to directly re-occupy most of southern Lebanon so it can 
secure its water needs. This view happens to.be the dominant one 
(Stauffer, 1982 and 1985; Naff and Matson, 1985). However, current 
realities in southern Lebanon and in Israel do not support this view. 
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Needless to say, the military option is, and will remain, open to 
Israel. Whichever route is to be taken by Israel, it would be a 
reaction to the rate of change in its structure of expectations. 
There is -a mechanism of socio-political control and normalization 
that is under way in the "security belt". This strategy injects 
greater certainty into future policy decisions which in turn influence 
the equilibrium in the balance of power phase (see Figure 5.2). This 
Israeli approach to water scarcity is one that provides Israel with new 
and reliable sources of water. On the other hand, it allows Israel 
greater control over the shape of the balance of power and the emerging 
expectations both domestically and regionally. 
As a result of the above, when the structure of expectations of 
water demand reaches a critical stage, Israel could then easily "test" 
the self-created status quo in the "security belt", and peacefully 
(with relatively minor opposition) acquire greater and reliable water 
resources from this area. In a prolonged case of severe drought, for 
example, the benefits of the "security belt" will become apparent. 
This suggests that the water conflict has not yet been through the full 
cycle of the conflict process, but is "stalled" in the balancing of 
power phase, at the stage of status-quo testing. 
5.6 Summary 
The first section of this chapter showed that both the latent and 
the initiation of conflict phases of the conflict process model (as 
depicted in Fig. 2.1) accurately confirm the conflict over water in the 
Middle East, most recently manifested between Israel and Lebanon. 
These two phases explain the historical evolution of the water 
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conflict, and how it developed over the years up until 1978. 
Israel's creation of the "security zone" in 1978 propelled it into 
the balancing of power phase where it is now stagnating. In this third 
phase, the water conflict starts to diverge from the process of 
conf 1 ict model. 
The second section of this chapter is devoted to the revised model 
as shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. The modifications discussed in this 
section are the following. First, states' by-proxy intervention abroad 
for the purpose of achieving resource-related objectives constitute an 
implicitly condoned and flexible approach to foreign policy. Israel's 
occupation-by-proxy of southern Lebanon and her making of a 
self-serving status quo environment, is a long-term strategy which is 
meant to be activated when a "real" water crisis befalls the country. 
The impact-mitigation approach to resource scarcity followed currently 
by Israel is conceptually supported by Gurr (1985: 73). He notes that 
Future scarcities of domestic sources of supply and 
uncertainty of foreign sources will tempt some rich states to 
use their political and military power to ensure safe and 
cheap sources of supply in the Third and Fourth Worlds. 
Conquest may not be necessary; intervention to install and 
provide military backing for client elites may achieve the 
same effect. 
This "by-proxy" approach. illustrated in Figure 5.2, plays a 
significant role in this case study. However, this point is neglected 
in the process of conflict model, Figure 2.1. Second, the use of the 
word "trigger" is deemed inappropriate to be used in the context of a 
naturally occurring resource scarcity. Third, the factor of "time", 
completely neglected by Rummel (1976) and by the discussion in Chapter 
Two, appears to have an important role in the conflict process. 
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Fourth, the structure of expectations plays a significant role in 
shaping the hydro-strategists' policies of Israel within the balancing 
of power phase. These deviations from the earlier model (Figs. 2.1 and 
2.2) reflect the distinguishing nature of a slowly onsetting resource 
scarcity and the policy (conflict) response to it. On the other hand, 
the deviations are in part due to the uniqueness of the case study: 
the general aridity of the region; the geopolitical setting which makes 
t 
for a lack of cooperation between the affected states; and the long 
term policy planning on the part of Israel. 
The model of conflict process sheds light on, and partly confirms, 
the once forgotten contributor to hostilities between Israel and 
Lebanon, namely conflict over water. 
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C H A P T E R S I X 
Summary and Conclusions 
In the Middle East, water is a scarce and an over-exploited 
resource for which demand is rising. This problem is amplified to 
dangerous proportions in the state of Israel as water scarcity seems to 
have induced conflicts between that country and her neighbours, most 
recently with Lebanon. Against this background and knowing Israel's 
long-standing interest in the Litani river of Lebanon, conflict theory 
was discussed and tested to ascertain if water scarcity in Israel was 
an inducing factor to its occupation by proxy of the water-rich area of 
south Lebanon, the "security zone." 
Many Israeli officials, including "water hawks" like Ariel Sharon, 
continue to speak of ceasing the Litani river Others believe that the 
Litani is the only available water source which will permit the current 
level of water consumption to continue. 
A de-emphasis of agriculture, a realistic pricing of water and the 
reduction of its subsidies are examples of domestic responses that 
could ease the water problem, and lead to a more efficient use of the 
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resource. But these are responses that are rarely considered. In the 
1970s, a gradual increase of water prices was introduced only to be 
defeated by the powerful agricultural lobby. This reflects (1) the 
lack of political will to implement austere water policies, and (2) the 
country's ideological commitment to agriculture; a fact established in 
Chapter Four. 
Although Israel has been in control of the "security zone" since 
1978, it has yet to openly divert the Litani river. Lebanon, however, 
charges that Israel has a "hidden water agenda", and is, at long last, 
seeking to achieve the cherished Zionist goal of expanding the 
boundaries of the Jewish state up to the Litani river. Due to the 
byzantine nature of politics in the Middle East, it is very difficult 
to refute "conspiracy" theories. 
Pronouncements by Israeli officials, and the country's declared 
water policy appear to support the existence of a "hidden water 
agenda". A few months after Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the 
former's Minister of Science and Technology, Yuval Neeman, asserted 
that his country (Israel) is not seeking to divert the Litani because 
utilization of the river's water inside Lebanon has reduced its flow to 
a "trickle", thus not worth diverting (Naff and Matson, 1984: 76-81). 
But the Minister added that if Lebanon wants to sell some of its water, 
Israel would be interested in purchasing it. Neeman also acknowledged 
that Israeli scientists' seismic soundings and their extensive surveys 
in Lebanon proved that it is technically feasible to divert the Litani 
into the Jordan river system. 
In 1984, large tracts of land near the Litani river's flow area in 
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south Lebanon were cordoned off by the Israeli army; an act that 
heightened Lebanon's concerns over its water resources. The Lebanese 
government complained to the United Nations Security Council about 
alleged "water-diverting activities" by Israel. Lebanon's 
representative to the U.N. stated (UN Chronicle. Vol.21, 1984: 12-13) 
that "Israel had been digging a tunnel that could absorb all the water 
of the Litani"; an allegation that was denied by the Israeli 
representative. 
According to Naff and Matson (1984), Israel is planning to increase 
the storage capacity of lake Tiberias and to add a fourth pumping 
station to the country's National Water Carrier. The implementation of 
such plans will make Israel technically ready to receive the additional 
waters of the Litani river; such plans will also confirm Lebanon's 
worst fear. 
The end of the civil war in Lebanon will signal the beginning of 
the reconstruction and development period, which will likely lead to 
higher standard of living. Thus, demand for water will skyrocket. In 
this thesis, a number of conclusions were reached. First, Israel is 
exploiting nearly all of its replenishable sources of water, thus 
adversely affecting the quality of coastal aquifers. Second, Israel's 
only realistic and immediate response to severe water shortages is a 
foreign one, namely by diverting Lebanon's Litani river. Third, this 
river is of primary importance to the development of south Lebanon, and 
to the unity of the ailing and battered state of Lebanon. Fourth, 
after testing the process of conflict model against the case study, a 
refined model is derived. It reflects more accurately the process of 
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international conflict over naturally (slowly) onsetting resource 
scarcities. 
This thesis established that the "security zone" arrangement, under 
the circumstances, is a flexible one allowing Israel a number of policy 
options all of which lead to its access to Lebanon's water resources. 
Knowing this, future research should investigate other luring resources 
or benefits (such as human and economic/trade resources) to this 
arrangement. If such research uses the same conceptual approach, it 
could either strengthen or weaken the conclusions of this thesis. 
Future research should also study the political and economic viability 
of Lebanon if it was to lose the Litani river. 
In a broader study on this subject, A broader study of this subject 
should consider Israel's dependence on, or "need" of the water 
resources, cheap labour force, and the captive market of the occupied 
territories (the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights), and how 
this affects the prospects of a comprehensive peace settlement to the 
larger Arab-Israeli conflict. 
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